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37 
PRE-DISPUTE ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS, 
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT, AND THE ECONOMIC 
DURESS DEFENSE: A CRITIQUE OF THREE 
COMMENTARIES  
STEVEN W. FELDMAN 
ABSTRACT 
Arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) is the most important topic 
in current contract law and commentary. The Supreme Court has issued eight merits 
decisions construing the FAA since 2011, the lower state and federal courts issued 
more than 1,000 decisions considering the FAA in 2014, and there were 81 full-
length articles, notes, and comments on arbitration in the same year.  
Recently, three commentators, Professor Margaret Jane Radin of the University 
of Michigan Law School, Professor Nancy S. Kim of the California Western School 
of Law, and former Lecturer in Law James P. Dawson of the Yale Law School, have 
proposed the use of an expanded economic duress defense to help consumers combat 
unfair pre-dispute arbitration agreements. This Article summarizes each 
commentator’s position and identifies my concerns. While such arbitration clauses 
can sometimes be unfair, all three proposals are flawed on numerous grounds. The 
primary problem is that the authors’ revised duress doctrines draw unworkable 
distinctions between improper coercion of offerees and legitimate bargaining 
techniques in a free market society. 
My analysis is the first in the legal literature that comprehensively discusses the 
connection between the economic duress defense generally and FAA arbitration 
specifically. As I will demonstrate, the two subject areas emphasize freedom of 
contract as they promote the necessary certainty and predictability of contractual 
relations. Thus, they accomplish the proper balance between binding the buyer to the 
arbitral process he agreed to in the contract and prohibiting the seller from enforcing 
a bargain if he procured it through unduly coercive tactics. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)1 is the most important topic 
in current contract law and commentary. The Supreme Court has issued eight merits 
                                                           
 1 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2012). 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol64/iss1/6
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decisions interpreting the FAA since 2011.2 In 2014, state and federal courts issued 
well over 1,000 decisions considering the FAA.3 Further, in 2014 scholars wrote 
eighty-one full-length articles, notes and comments on arbitration. Recently, three 
commentators—Professor Margaret Jane Radin, Professor Nancy S. Kim, and 
former Lecturer in Law James P. Dawson—each proposed the use of an expanded 
economic duress defense to help consumers combat what the authors believe to be 
unfair pre-dispute arbitration clauses.4 This Article summarizes each commentator’s 
position, provides my concerns about their proposals, and suggests an overarching 
theory for the legal doctrine of economic duress under the FAA. 
Even though Radin, Kim, and Dawson wish to “expand” the economic duress 
defense, all three authors couch their proposals in the traditional terminology of 
economic duress: coercion, oppression, the offeror’s wrongful acts, and the offeree’s 
absence of reasonable alternatives.5 While differing in some of the details, the three 
proposals have striking parallels. Each author contends (1) true assent is lacking in 
these adhesion contracts; (2) companies are exploiting consumers; and (3) traditional 
notions of duress should be “expanded” to protect “vulnerable” consumers because 
of their need for the relevant product or service.6  
Because each author relies to an extent on current economic duress doctrine, it is 
fair to analyze whether each proposal meets foundational legal standards. This 
Article in no way criticizes the three commentators for expanding existing law. My 
                                                           
 2 BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198 (2014); Am. Express Co. v. 
Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 
2064 (2013); Nitro-Lift Techs., LLC v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500 (2012); Marmet Health Care 
Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012); CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 
(2012); KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 132 S. Ct. 23 (2011); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 
131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).  
 3 State courts considering challenges to an arbitration agreement must apply the FAA to a 
transaction involving interstate commerce. See, e.g., Frizzell Constr. Co. v. Gatlinburg, LLC, 
9 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tenn. 1999) (“[T]he provisions of the FAA are to be applied in both state 
and federal courts”) (citing decisions). While this Article focuses on the FAA, almost all states 
have their own arbitration statutes. See Stephen Wills Murphy, Note, Judicial Review of 
Arbitration Awards Under State Law, 96 VA. L. REV. 887, 890 (2010). A number of states 
recognize duress as an enforcement defense under state arbitration requirements. E.g., St. 
Fleur v. WPI Cable Sys./Mutron, 879 N.E.2d 27, 31 (Mass. 2008); Moore v. Woman to 
Woman Obstetrics & Gynecology, LLC, 3 A.3d 535, 539 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010); 
Hill v. NHC Healthcare/Nashville, LLC, No. M2005–01818–COA–R3–CV, 2008 WL 
1901198, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2008). 
 4 MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS AND, THE 
RULE OF LAW (2013); Nancy S. Kim, Situational Duress and the Aberrance of Electronic 
Contracts, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 265 (2014); James P. Dawson, Comment, Contract After 
Concepcion: Some Lessons from the State Courts, 124 YALE L.J. 233 (2014). 
 5 RADIN, supra note 4, at 15, 20, 123, 151; Kim, supra note 4, at 266, 276-78, 282; 
Dawson, supra note 4, at 234-35, 243. 
 6 RADIN, supra note 4, at 5, 20, 93-95,151-52; Kim, supra note 4, at 266, 271 n.32, 277-
86; Dawson, supra note 4, at 240-45. For the earliest analysis of duress and arbitration, see 
Sharona Hoffman, Mandatory Arbitration: Alternative Dispute Resolution or Coercive 
Dispute Suppression? 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 131, 153 (1996) (“[T]he threat of 
unemployment in many cases will induce employees to agree to compulsory arbitration 
regardless of their opposition to the policy and thus will constitute duress.”).  
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primary concern is that their proposals draw unworkable distinctions between 
legitimate free market bargaining techniques and improper coercion of offerees. My 
analysis will show that Radin, Kim, and Dawson deviate in numerous and prejudicial 
ways from well-settled and carefully balanced legal principles governing the 
economic duress defense. I will combine this doctrinal assessment of their proposals 
with a normative critique of their expansions of the economic duress defense. In 
providing this analysis, I acknowledge the extensive commentary criticizing (or 
defending) the Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence7 and that a pre-dispute 
arbitration clause can sometimes be unfair. 
Besides assessing the three commentators’ suggestions, this Article operates on a 
deeper level that can assist scholars, bench, and bar. This Article is the first in the 
legal literature that comprehensively discusses the intersection between the FAA and 
the economic duress defense. The positive theme I propose is that the economic 
duress defense and the FAA emphasize freedom of contract and help solidify the 
certainty and predictability of contractual relations. I use the three proposals as a 
vehicle for showing why current law is fair and effective. Thus, the economic duress 
defense works well as courts accomplish the proper balance between binding the 
offeree to the arbitral process agreed to in the contract and prohibiting the offeror 
from enforcing a bargain procured through unduly coercive tactics.   
This Article will proceed as follows. Part I summarizes each author’s reform. 
Part II shows how the FAA preempts the authors’ particular duress formulation as a 
challenge to contractual arbitration. Part III demonstrates how the authors’ suggested 
revamping of economic duress doctrine would impair freedom of contract and 
destabilize the predictability and certainty of contract, especially consumer 
agreements.   
I. OVERVIEW OF THE THREE PROPOSALS 
A. Radin’s Proposal 
Margaret Jane Radin, the Henry King Ransom Professor of Law at the University 
of Michigan and the William Benjamin Scott and Luna M. Scott Professor of Law, 
Emerita, at Stanford University, is the author of Boilerplate: The Fine Print, 
Vanishing Rights, and the Rule of Law.8 Her book received high praise from most 
commentators, earning such plaudits as “groundbreaking,”9 “a great achievement,” 
“eloquent and powerful,”10 and a “masterpiece.”11 
                                                           
 7 E.g., Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a 
Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99 (2006); Jean 
R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is it Just? 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631 (2005). 
Compare Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law (With a 
Contractualist Reply to Carrington & Haagen), 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 195 (1998) (defending 
the Court’s approach), with Steven J. Burton, The New Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: 
Federal Preemption, Contract Unconscionability, and Agreements to Arbitrate, 2006 J. DISP. 
RESOL. 469, 480 (2006) (“There is reason to believe that arbitration clauses lower the contract 
price of the goods, services, or money, or provide weaker parties with more advantageous 
terms, because arbitration reduces the parties’ joint costs of contracting.”). 
 8 RADIN, supra note 4. 
 9 Hugh J. Treacy, Book Review, in Benjamin J. Keele & Nick Sexton, Keeping Up with 
New Legal Titles, 105 L. LIBR. J. 369, 376-77 (2013) (“[W]e now have a thoughtfully crafted 
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In Boilerplate, Radin observes that the legal system must contrast consent with 
non-consent with regard to a person’s allegedly “agreed-upon” transfer of 
entitlements.12 She contends that a principal type of non-consent is “coercion and its 
allied conceptions of force and duress” and that one “controversial” aspect of duress 
and coercion in the field of contracts is economic duress.13 
Radin heavily criticizes mass market mandatory arbitration clauses as a 
prominent example of what she calls an improper “boilerplate rights deletion 
scheme.”14 She believes that these clauses deprive “large numbers of people both of 
their right to jury trial and their right to aggregative remedies (either class actions or 
classwide arbitration).”15 In this respect, Radin argues that the indigent are the 
powerless victims of these duplicitous practices.  
She further poses the dilemma poor people would face if the law invalidated 
these oppressive rights deletion schemes.  In colorful language, Radin argues that the 
poor would have to elect between the “frying pan” and “the fire.”16 “The frying pan 
is [the consumer] being deprived of rights without consent; the fire is [the consumer] 
being deemed unable to enter into enforceable contracts.”17 In Radin’s opinion, it is 
doubtful that the recipient exercises free choice with these transactions.18 
Accordingly, Radin believes that the law must enhance the traditional regulatory 
measures for abusive merchant practices.19 One such regulatory measure in need of 
reform, according to her, is economic duress. 
                                                           
work of scholarship that will challenge readers to achieve new understandings of contract law 
within our print and electronic boilerplate world. . . . [I]t is a groundbreaking work.”). 
 10 Oren Bar-Gill, Boilerplate Symposium VII: Oren Bar-Gill on Consent Without Reading, 
LAW PROFESSOR BLOGS NETWORK: CONTRACTSPROFBLOG (May 21, 2013), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/contractsprof_blog/2013/05/boilerplate-symposium-vii-
oren-bar-gill-on-consent-without-reading-.html (“Professor Radin’s book is an eloquent and 
powerful critique of the fine-term, boilerplate contracts that pervade modern life. . . . Radin’s 
book is a great achievement.”). 
 11 David Horton, Mass Arbitration and Democratic Legitimacy, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 459, 
464 (2013) (“dense and sprawling masterpiece”); see also Theresa Amato, Boilerplate 
Symposium II: Theresa Amato on Remedies to the Problems Posed by Boilerplate, LAW 
PROFESSOR BLOGS NETWORK: CONTRACTSPROFBLOG (May 14, 2013), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/contractsprof_blog/2013/05/boilerplate-symposium-ii-
theresa-amato-on-remedies-to-the-problems-posed-by-boilerplate.html (“Professor Radin's 
masterpiece Boilerplate sets forth the intellectual underpinnings for an energetic movement to 
correct the imbalance of power between corporations and consumers in fine print contracts.”). 
 12 RADIN, supra note 4, at 20. 
 13 Id. at 20, 123, 150-51, 275-76 nn.2 & 3 (discussing the economic duress defense). 
 14 Id. at 35. 
 15 Id. at 130. 
 16 Id. at 150. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. at 150-51. 
 19 Id. at 150-53. 
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Regarding economic duress, Radin notes that the law is unclear on what types of 
choices arise from consent or coercion.20 She indicates that the easy cases are when 
the actor threatens the victim with physical harm if he does not accede to the actor’s 
desires — “[y]our money or your life” — but she says most circumstances are not so 
clear-cut.21 She further indicates whether a choice represents true volition is open to 
dispute.22 “[S]ufficiently exploitive” terms, Radin believes, can still be coercive and 
unenforceable even where the victim manifests assent to the wrongdoer.23 She posits 
that the law must clearly define coercive terms and explain which fact situations 
support a finding of economic duress.24 
As a remedy for improper arbitration clauses, she proposes refocusing economic 
duress from “expectation” to “exploitation.”25 Radin explains that “[r]ecipients 
could theoretically . . . invoke some species of duress when presented with take-it-
or-leave it boilerplate in acquiring a necessity of life . . . .”26 But at the same time, 
she contends that “[t]hese traditional doctrines were in the past interpreted quite 
narrowly by the courts.”27 
B. Kim’s Proposal 
Nancy S. Kim is Professor of Law and ProFlowers Distinguished Professor of 
Internet Studies at the California Western School of Law and the author of Wrap 
Contacts: Foundations and Ramifications,28 which examines how electronic 
contracts impact society and control consumer behavior. Reviewers have called her 
book “provocative, thoroughly researched with terrific references, and very 
stimulating.”29  
In an article that replicates her points in Wrap Contracts, Kim considers mass-
market consumer electronic contracts to be a “particularly virulent strain of aberrant 
contract.”30 Kim sees these contracts as unfair in “their form, their medium, and 
their content,” which creates extra perils for consumers beyond conventional paper 
contracts.31  
More specifically, Kim argues at length that these contracts exploit consumers in 
several ways. First, they foster confusion because merchants promulgate them in 
various modes and thereby cause uncertainty because consumers do not understand 
                                                           
 20 Id. at 151. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. at 275 n.2 (internal punctuation omitted).   
 27 Id. 
 28 NANCY S. KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS (2013). 
 29 Frederic H. Marienthal, Book Review, 43 COLO. LAW. 108, 108 (2014). 
 30 Kim, supra note 4, at 265. 
 31 Id. 
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the terms.32 Second, websites can be deceptively consumer-friendly, such that a 
mere click of the mouse can form a contract. 33 The use of hyperlinks in electronic 
contracts, she believes, is often a trap for the unwary.34 Further, Kim attacks the 
practice in which merchants reserve the right to make unilateral contract 
modifications where the consumer “accepts” the changed term by continuing to 
access or receive services after the revisions become effective.35 Kim indicates that 
it is even more unfair where the consumer will be deemed bound by his failure to 
actively reject the contract after receiving notice of the terms, such as with 
browsewraps.36  
Kim believes companies take gross advantage of consumers’ well-known 
proclivity to accept the terms without reading them, even when the terms are one-
sided in favor of the merchant and often oppressive to the consumer.37 Thus, Kim 
contends that the common-law duty to read a contract—which binds the offeree 
regardless of his understanding or acknowledgement of the terms—should apply 
with less force in electronic contracting.38 The reasons she offers for abrogating this 
duty are the sheer mass of material in electronic contracts and the pervasive use of 
hyperlinks. According to Kim, “[t]oday, a consumer is practically unable to engage 
in any online activity without being forced to accept the terms of an electronic 
contract.”39 
To counteract merchants that misuse electronic contracts to exploit consumers, 
Kim proposes an “expanded” duress defense, which she calls “situational duress.”40 
To prevail in a claim for contract avoidance, the consumer must show the drafting 
company made an improper threat leaving the consumer with no reasonable 
alternative.41 Where the consumer meets its burden of proof, the contract would be 
void and not merely voidable as under current law.42 
This situational duress defense does not cover all instances of electronic 
contracting: 
Rather, the defense should be used in the electronic contracting context if 
(1) a drafting company uses an electronic contract to block consumer 
                                                           
 32 Id. 
 33 Kim observes that as compared with paper contracts, where consumers understand they 
are entering into a contract when they sign, electronic contracts can leave the consumer “often 
ignorant that any bargain has taken place.” Id. at 274. 
 34 Id. at 272. 
 35 Id. at 271. 
 36 Id. at 267. 
 37 Id. at 266. 
 38 Id. at 275-76. 
 39 Id. at 276. 
 40 Id. at 286-87. 
 41 Id. at 266. 
 42 Id.  
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access to a product or service; (2) the consumer has a “vested interest”43 
in that product or service; and (3) the consumer accepts the terms because 
she was blocked from the product or service after attempting to reject or 
decline them. In these situations, the consumer's action should not be 
effective as a manifestation of assent and the contract should be void.44 
Regarding the improper threat element in a contract avoidance claim, Kim says 
the merchant “acts improperly or wrongfully by creating a situation that results in an 
unfair choice: contract acceptance or forfeiture.”45 For Kim, this creates coercion 
because “the company is threatening the consumer with the loss of something in 
which she has a vested property or proprietorship interest.”46 She further explains 
that the threat looms over the consumer because he or she has “no choice but to 
accept the new or additional terms or forfeit her content and contracts.”47 As for the 
element that the consumer has “no reasonable alternative” except to enter the 
contract, the consumer must establish that he or she “attempted to decline or reject 
the terms but was forced to accept them.”48 If the merchant makes it difficult for the 
consumer to reject the electronic contract, she argues, that action renders the consent 
coerced and the consumer has a valid defense of situational duress. 49 
C. Dawson’s Proposal 
James P. Dawson is a former Lecturer in Law at Yale Law School. He argues 
for an expanded economic duress defense in arbitration cases in response to the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.50 In Concepcion, 
the Court held that the FAA preempts California's judicial rule permitting an 
unconscionability defense that forecloses the consumer’s ability to bring a class-
wide remedy to an arbitration clause.51   
Dawson observes that some state courts have read Concepcion narrowly to 
remedy what he indicates is the Court’s brazenly “conservative” and “anti-
consumer” approval of “forced arbitration” clauses.52 Applauding these state court 
efforts, Dawson contends that additional “ambitious” and “innovative” remedies are 
                                                           
 43 The consumer has a “vested interest” in the product or service when (1) the merchant 
uses a “rolling contract,” (i.e., the merchant furnishes the consumer the terms after the 
completion of the acts constituting offer and acceptance) or (2) the consumer is a “content 
hostage,” (i.e., when the consumer uses a service that permits him to store content on the 
company’s servers, such as Facebook or Twitter). Id. at 279-80. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 282. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. at 283. 
 48 Id. at 283-84. 
 49 Id. at 278, 279, 283. 
 50 Dawson, supra note 4 (analyzing AT &T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 
(2011)). 
 51 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011). 
 52 Dawson, supra note 4, at 233. 
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needed to “cabin” Concepcion and to assist state court judges in remaining the “final 
arbiter” of state law.53   
Dawson focuses on the economic duress defense as one antidote to Concepcion. 
Under the FAA, duress is a generally applicable defense to the enforcement of an 
arbitration agreement or clause.54 The Supreme Court has stated repeatedly that a 
party’s allegation of economic duress can be a viable basis under the FAA to 
challenge an arbitration contract.55 Dawson proposes to “expand” the contract 
defense of economic duress to make it easier to invalidate arbitration provisions. 56 
In his view, current duress doctrine would be improved if it displayed more 
sensitivity to “social inequality and context and included aggrieved parties’ 
experience and perspectives.”57 
Dawson references one current common-law version of the duress defense in 
which a “party with superior bargaining power committed a wrongful act, threatened 
the party with inferior bargaining power, or otherwise engaged in oppressive or 
coercive behavior.”58 Dawson’s replacement duress formulation is that “no valid 
contract can be formed when an offeror proposes a take-it-or-leave-it deal requiring 
the offeree to either (1) consent to a nonnegotiable contract clause requiring 
arbitration of all disputes or else (2) forego something that a reasonable person 
would deem necessary for modern life.” 59  
                                                           
 53 Id. at 233-34. For similar criticisms, see Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility 
LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703 (2012). Other 
commentators have a more optimistic view of Concepcion. See Christopher R. Drahozal, FAA 
Preemption After Concepcion, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 153, 154 (2014) (“[A]t least 
some of the preemption holdings courts have attributed to Concepcion are due, not to 
Concepcion, but instead to well-established law predating Concepcion.”). 
 54 For a court to consider the duress defense to the enforcement of an arbitration clause, 
the alleged coercion must relate specifically either to the arbitration clause rather than to the 
contract as a whole or to both the arbitration clause and the overall contract. See Prima Paint 
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403–04 (1967); Associated Elec. Co-op., 
Inc. v. International Broth. of Elec. Workers, Local No. 53, 751 F.3d 898, 905 (8th Cir. 2014); 
Bilyeu v. Johanson Berenson LLP, 809 F. Supp. 2d 547, 552 (W.D. La. 2011) (analyzing 
decisions). Otherwise, the arbitrator decides the issue of duress. See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 
403–04; see also Associated Elec. Co-op., Inc., 751 F.3d at 905. 
 55 See, e.g., Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746 (“[9 U.S.C.§ 2] permits agreements to arbitrate 
to be invalidated by ‘generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or 
unconscionability,’ but not by defenses that apply only to arbitration or that derive their 
meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.”); Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. 
v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 68 (2010) (“Like other contracts, however, [arbitration agreements] 
may be invalidated by ‘generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or 
unconscionability.’”); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) 
(“[G]enerally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be 
applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening [the FAA].”).   
 56  Dawson, supra note 4, at 233-34.   
 57 Id. at 244 (quoting Orit Gan, Contractual Duress and Relations of Power, 36 HARVARD 
J.L. & GENDER 171, 171 (2013)). 
 58  Id. at 243 (citing Teradyne, Inc. v. Mostek Corp, 797 F.2d 43, 57 (1st Cir. 1986); Fees 
v. Mut. Fire & Auto Ins. Co., 490 N.W.2d 55, 58 (Iowa 1992)). 
 59 Id. at 242. 
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Dawson contends that his proposal “remain[s] faithful to Supreme Court 
precedent” based on the Court’s oft-repeated statement that arbitration is “a matter of 
consent, not coercion.”60 Further, he believes that his proposal to expand economic 
duress doctrine comports with the basic notion of the defense, which is whether “a 
party with superior bargaining power has coerce[d] the other party to accept the 
terms because of the latter’s severe economic necessity.”61   
II. FAA PREEMPTION AND THE PROPOSALS FOR AN EXPANDED DURESS DEFENSE 
Radin devotes some attention to FAA preemption62 but does not expressly 
consider whether FAA preemption would impact her proposal. Kim does not raise 
the possibility that the FAA could preempt her proposed reform. Although Dawson 
asserts he wishes to “remain[ ] faithful to Supreme Court precedent”63 and 
acknowledges the FAA rule of preemption,64 Dawson also does not analyze whether 
his expanded duress defense would survive FAA preemption. The following 
discussion will explain why the FAA would preempt all three authors’ proposals. 
A. FAA Overview and Preemption Principles 
A “strong” public policy favors arbitration over litigation because arbitration is 
expeditious, avoids litigation delays, relieves court congestion, and is more 
economically efficient, for all parties, than a jury trial.65 Congress enacted the FAA 
to execute this policy and overcome judicial hostility to arbitration agreements.66 
Under the FAA, a written provision agreeing to settle by arbitration a controversy 
arising out of a contract involving interstate commerce is “valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of 
any contract.”67 As part of this objective, Congress has protected arbitration 
agreements by putting them on “an equal footing as compared with other 
contracts.”68 The “equal footing” doctrine means that the FAA “does not favor or 
elevate arbitration agreements to a level of importance above all other contracts; it 
simply ensures that private agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their 
terms.”69  
                                                           
 60 Id. at 244 (quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 681 
(2010)). 
 61 Id. at 242 (quoting Candace Zierdt & Ellen S. Podgor, Corporate Deferred Prosecutions 
Through the Looking Glass of Contract Policing, 96 KY. L.J. 1, 26-27 (2008)). 
 62 See RADIN, supra note 4, at 131-35, 278, 283. 
 63 Dawson, supra note 4, at 235. 
 64 Id. at 240.  
 65 E.g., Sverdrup Corp. v. WHC Constructors, Inc., 989 F.2d 148, 152 (4th Cir. 1993); 
Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 552 P.2d 1178, 1186 (Cal. 1976). 
 66 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011). 
 67 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 68 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745. 
 69 Kirby v. Lion Enters., Inc., 756 S.E.2d 493, 497-98 (W. Va. 2014) (quoting State ex rel. 
Richmond Am. Homes of W. Va., Inc. v. Sanders, 717 S.E.2d 909, 917 (W. Va. 2011)); see 
also Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748 (finding the purpose of the FAA is to “ensur[e] that 
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The FAA’s reach is “broad” and coextensive with the “full reach” of the 
Commerce Clause.70 Consumer contracts are subject to the same rules as other 
agreements.71 While the FAA preempts state law specifically targeting arbitration, 
the FAA does not override generally applicable state contract defenses, such as 
fraud, duress, or unconscionability.72 Thus, for example, the Supreme Court has 
stated repeatedly that a party’s allegation of economic duress can be a viable basis to 
challenge an arbitration contract.73 The FAA also does not preempt a neutral state-
law contract formation requirement simply because it can be used to invalidate an 
arbitration agreement.74   
The Supreme Court’s standard on FAA preemption is quite strict. The Court has 
stated that “[a] state-law principle that takes its meaning precisely from the fact that 
a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport with [the equal footing] 
requirement of [9 U.S.C.] § 2.”75 Another core principle is that “state [law] requiring 
greater information or choice in the making of agreements to arbitrate than in other 
contracts is preempted.”76 Further, a state statute or legal doctrine may not treat 
arbitration as an “inferior means of dispute resolution.”77 For this reason, the 
Supreme Court has disapproved “attacks on arbitration [that] ‘res[t] on suspicion of 
arbitration as a method of weakening the protections afforded in the substantive law 
to would-be complainants,’ and as such, they are ‘far out of step with our current 
strong endorsement of the federal statutes favoring this method of resolving 
disputes.’”78   
                                                           
private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms”) (quoting Volt Info. 
Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989)). 
 70 Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490 (1987). 
 71 THI of N.M. at Hobbs Ctr., LLC v. Patton, 741 F.3d 1162, 1167 (10th Cir. 2014). 
 72 L & R Farm P’ship v. Cargill Inc., 963 F. Supp. 2d 798, 803 (W.D. Tenn. 2013) (citing 
Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)). 
 73 E.g., Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 68 (2010).    
 74 Mitchell v. Am. Fair Credit Ass’n, Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 193, 201 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2002). 
 75 Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9. 
 76 Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (quoting 2 IAN MACNEIL 
ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 19.1.1, (1994)). 
 77 See THI of N.M. at Hobbs Ctr., LLC v. Patton, 741 F.3d 1162, 1165-66 (10th Cir. 2014) 
(citing Supreme Court decisions).   
 78 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30 (1991) (quoting Rodriguez de 
Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989)). For other commentary on 
FAA preemption and arbitration, see, for example, William G. Phelps, Annotation, Pre-
emption by Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C.A. §§ 1 et seq.) of state laws prohibiting or 
restricting formation or enforcement of arbitration agreements, 108 A.L.R. Fed. 179 (1992); 
Hiro N. Aragaki, Arbitration's Suspect Status, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1233 (2011); Hiro N. 
Aragaki, Equal Opportunity for Arbitration, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1189 (2011); Christopher R. 
Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393 (2004); David S. Schwartz, 
The Federal Arbitration Act and the Power of Congress over State Courts, 83 OR. L. REV. 541 
(2004); Kristopher Kleiner, Comment, AT&T Mobility LLC v Concepcion: The 
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B. Radin’s Approach and the FAA 
Radin is unabashed in her philosophical opposition to contemporary pre-dispute 
arbitration terms in mass-market consumer contracts.  Radin repeatedly indicates that 
these clauses are a blight on the U.S. economy.79 She also contends that they 
degrade U.S. democratic institutions because these arbitral contracts improperly 
require consumers to forfeit numerous state-granted rights, such as the right to trial 
by jury.80 Further, she objects that modern pre-dispute arbitration terms and 
processes that: (1) bypass the consumer's right to collective remedies, such as class 
actions and class arbitration; (2) result in decisions rarely subject to appellate review; 
(3) involve arbitrators that are usually business persons who are more sympathetic to 
merchants than consumers; and (4) are inefficient because they are secret, ad hoc 
and, non-precedential.81 
Indeed, her antipathy goes so deep that she accuses the Supreme Court in its 
interpretation of the FAA of condoning “invidious” racial or sexual discrimination 
and of “underwriting democratic degradation” of governmental institutions by 
“making redress impossible, in practice if not in theory, for large numbers of 
people.”82 Thus, for Radin, the current arbitration system is inconsistent with the 
“rule of law”;83 however, Radin gives minimal attention to another rule of law: FAA 
preemption. Radin’s implacable opposition reveals her view that pre-dispute 
arbitration, as administered under mass-market consumer contracts, is inferior to 
litigation and such arbitral provisions should be targeted for “severe” modification or 
even elimination.84 Hence, her suggestion would be preempted as failing the “equal 
footing” rule.   
C. Kim’s Approach and the FAA 
Kim’s proposal overlooks FAA preemption as she emphasizes the perceived 
“aberrant” features of adhesion contracts versus required arbitration clauses.85 
Nevertheless, she includes arbitration clauses in the “aberrant” contract category and 
inappropriately singles out these clauses as “one sided,” “onerous,” and “unfair” to 
consumers.86 Therefore, her proposal also could not overcome the “equal footing” 
rule. 
                                                           
Disappearance of the Presumption Against Preemption in the Context of the FAA, 89 DENV. 
U. L. REV. 747 (2012). 
 79 See, e.g., RADIN, supra note 4, at 15-18. 
 80 Id. at 183. 
 81 Id. at 134-35. 
 82 Id. at 183. 
 83 Id. at 132-33, 183. Radin repeatedly couples “mass market boiler plate” with the 
pejorative word “scheme.” See, e.g., id. at 35, 39, 174. 
 84 Id. at 183. 
 85 See Kim, supra note 4, at 1-11. 
 86 Id. at 271, 282. 
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D. Dawson’s Approach and the FAA 
Dawson’s theme resembles Radin’s, in that both authors are diametrically 
opposed to adhesive pre-dispute arbitration clauses. Although Dawson’s opinion, 
when it comes to enforcement of required arbitration clauses, is “the equities so 
strongly favor the claimant,”87 the legal rule is the opposite. Courts have observed, 
“rather than being viewed as oppressive, arbitration clauses are favored by both state 
and federal law as an economical form of dispute resolution which relieves the 
congestion of overburdened courts.”88 Despite FAA preemption case law, Dawson 
repeatedly focuses on (and wishes to strike down) contracts solely because they have 
arbitration as a required remedy.89 Alternatively, Dawson believes that arbitration is 
an inferior rights vindication mechanism as compared with litigation;90 this position, 
which is equally fatal to his case, also flaunts the FAA. 
To prove the last point, a careful review of Dawson’s Comment reflects his 
strong disapproval of contemporary arbitration. He suggests, “[g]iven that economic 
duress is a court-made concept, courts could also loosen or even suspend the 
[traditional] wrongful-act requirement [in arbitration cases].”91 In his Comment, 
Dawson makes clear that his concern is to combat what he pejoratively and 
repeatedly terms “forced-arbitration”92 (a label mostly used in the literature by 
partisan “employee advocates”).93 Employee advocates use the term “forced-
arbitration” to distinguish this practice from what they view as voluntarily negotiated 
arbitration in the workplace.94  
“Forced-arbitration,” as used by Dawson and others, is a loaded term because it 
fails to explain why the parties’ manifested assent, in the form of a signed contract, 
to pre-dispute arbitration is insufficient to establish a binding agreement. By using 
the code word “forced-arbitration” Dawson has fallen into the mistake of substituting 
labels for analysis. Professor Macneil addressed a similar issue when he observed:  
Using such terms as compulsory or mandatory in such circumstances is, at 
best, highly confusing. At worst, it constitutes question-begging: The very 
question at stake where such questions arise is whether whatever consent 
to arbitrate as has been manifested should or should not be given full 
contractual effect. To call the arbitration compulsory or mandatory is to 
answer by label, not by attention to the facts and by analysis.95 
                                                           
 87 Dawson, supra note 4, at 243. 
 88 Rust v. Drexel Firestone Inc., 352 F. Supp. 715, 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (citing cases). 
 89 Dawson, supra note 4, at 243-46 (stating ways in which he believes arbitration clauses 
violate legal norms). 
 90 See generally id. 
 91 Id. at 243.   
 92 See, e.g., id. at 234, 247.  
 93 See Andrew J. Gordon & Kimberley C. Weber, Foreword: Forced Arbitration in the 
Workplace, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 1 n.1 (2014).  
 94 Id. 
 95 2 IAN MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 17.1.2.2 (1994).   
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In his heavy criticisms of arbitration as an inferior form of dispute resolution, 
Dawson further complains that merchants seek to overwhelm consumers with 
confusing and lengthy boilerplate terms so that consumers will accept arbitration 
without actual agreement to this process: “[consumers] ‘consent’ to these arbitration 
clauses because they don’t know what else to do.”96 Dawson’s criticism on this point 
is off-target because he does not address the settled rules of contractual assent. Thus, 
if the offeree’s outward actions convey assent to the offeror from an objective 
standpoint, there is no requirement that the offeree subjectively assent.97 
Commentators have argued that many reasons, such as the lack of awareness, the 
lack of perceived alternatives, and the impact of cognitive biases, demonstrate true 
subjective assent is frequently missing in contracting.98   
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts, however, has a different take:   
Customers do not in fact ordinarily understand or even read the standard 
terms. They trust to the good faith of the party using the form and to the 
tacit representation that like terms are being accepted regularly by others 
similarly situated. But they understand that they are assenting to the terms 
not read or not understood, subject to such limitations as the law may 
impose.99 
Note further that if the party bringing the claim sues in court and bypasses a 
contractual requirement for arbitration, any notion of “forced-arbitration” is 
academic if the responding party also does not insist upon arbitration. In this 
situation, the moving party creates a right of election in the respondent to require 
arbitration, which it can decline.100 
In many other respects, Dawson’s suspicion of arbitration as a fair method of 
alternative dispute resolution is intense and pervasive. He believes that state courts 
must “protect lay claimants” from an “anti-consumer” Supreme Court bent on 
                                                           
 96 See Dawson, supra note 4, at 246. 
 97 See, e.g., Innova Hosp. San Antonio, L.P. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ga., 995 F. 
Supp. 2d 587, 609 (N.D. Tex. 2014) (“Whether a contract has been formed is determined by 
the ‘objective standard of what the parties said and how they acted, not by their subjective 
state of mind.’”) (arbitration case); Bloomington Partners, LLC v. City of Bloomington, 364 
F. Supp. 2d 772, 779 (C.D. Ill. 2005) (“To determine whether the parties intended to be bound 
by the alleged contract, a court looks not to the parties’ subjective intent, but rather to 
objective evidence of their intent as expressed to each other in their writings.”) (arbitration 
case); see also DeLeon v. Verizon Wireless, LLC, 143 Cal. Rptr. 3d 810, 820-21  (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2012) (“Mutual consent necessary to the formation of a contract ‘is determined under an 
objective standard applied to the outward manifestations or expressions of the parties, i.e., the 
reasonable meaning of their words and acts, and not their unexpressed intentions or 
understandings.’ Although mutual consent is a question of fact, whether a certain or 
undisputed state of facts establishes a contract is a question of law for the court.”) (quoting 
Alexander v. Codemasters Grp. Ltd., 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 145, 152 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)). 
 98 See, e.g., Brian H. Bix, Contracts, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 
251-52 (Franklin G. Miller & Alan Wertheimer eds., 2010). 
 99 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (emphasis 
added).   
 100 See Vireo, P.L.L.C. v. Cates, 953 S.W.2d 489, 491-92 (Tex. App. 1997). 
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“colonizing” state contract law.101 Dawson sees a Supreme Court that has (a) 
improperly overturned “decades” of its arbitration precedents, (b) usurped state 
courts “of their traditional role as the final arbiter of contracts,” and (c) attempted to 
“pull the wool over the nation’s eyes” with decisions like Concepcion.102 Dawson, 
however, gives little heed to judicial pronouncements that “even generally applicable 
state-law rules are preempted if in practice they have a ‘disproportionate impact’ on 
arbitration or ‘interfere[ ] with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus create[ ] 
a scheme inconsistent with the FAA.’”103  
Still other passages from his Comment strengthen Dawson’s view that non-
negotiable boilerplate arbitration harms the commercial system. He posits that such 
clauses require consumers to relinquish commodities “necessary to live in the 
twenty-first century.”104 Furthermore, these “forced arbitration clauses” have 
“stripped lay claimants of basic procedural protections and given big business the 
ability to abuse consumers without fear of class-action liability.”105 Dawson accuses 
the Supreme Court of a “hypnotic obsession with consent [that] is impossible to 
square with the facts on the ground”106 and that masks the Court’s approval of 
consumer “coercion.”107 Where an adhesion agreement contains an arbitration 
clause, Dawson wants state courts to engage in an “aggressive interrogation of a 
contract’s formation.”108 He further shows his preference for litigation over 
arbitration when he cites the “troubling reality” that  “nearly every action” that 
Americans take — “right down to include eating a bowl of Cheerios—could 
constitute a waiver of their right to enter court.”109    
By generating this barrage of criticisms about the legitimacy of arbitration, 
Dawson is sealing his proposal to the doom of FAA preemption. Oddly, Dawson 
makes no meaningful attempt to analyze whether his proposal meets the FAA’s 
preemption standards. The closest he comes to a defense against FAA preemption is 
his claim that his theory “would allow judges to deploy duress doctrine to void all 
sorts of contracts—ranging from spousal agreements to mortgages to forced 
arbitration clauses.”110 In other words, Dawson uses these afterthoughts to recast his 
doctrine implicitly as one of general applicability to avoid the equal footing rule. 
                                                           
 101 Dawson, supra note 4, at 233, 235. 
 102 Id. at 234-235, 246.  
 103 Mortensen v. Bresnan Commc’ns, LLC, 722 F.3d 1151, 1159 (9th Cir. 2013) (alteration 
in original) (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) 
(rejecting argument that Montana’s standard for enhanced mutual assent applied to all 
contracts). In Concepcion, the Court rejected the argument that California’s version of 
unconscionability applied to all contracts. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748.  
 104 Dawson, supra note 4, at 244. 
 105 Id. at 247. 
 106 Id. at 244.    
 107 Id. at 238, 244, 247. 
 108 Id. at 238. 
 109 Id. at 247. 
 110 Id. at 244. 
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Despite this possibility, Dawson’s duress model cannot escape that it is 
specifically designed to reduce the availability of arbitration, which contravenes the 
FAA’s “equal footing” doctrine. But for the perceived problems of contractual 
arbitration, Dawson would not be proposing a reform of duress doctrine.111 It takes 
very little for a state legislature or court to express undue hostility to arbitration to 
warrant preemption; even a passing observation could suffice.112 Dawson more than 
amply meets this low threshold. Therefore, Dawson cannot overcome that his 
proposal adversely targets arbitration because his desired effect is to “cabin” 
arbitration agreements and to “limit the scope of FAA preemption.”113 Dawson 
misses that the Supreme Court has ruled, “[w]hat States may not do is decide that a 
contract is fair enough to enforce all its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not 
fair enough to enforce its arbitration clause.”114    
It cannot be gainsaid that these three proposals do not derive their meaning from 
whether arbitration is at issue (in whole or part) or that their authors greatly prefer 
litigation over arbitration. Because all three authors’ proposals violate the “equal 
footing” rule of the FAA, the FAA would preempt their suggestions for a more 
lenient duress defense in arbitration cases.  
III. THE RADICAL (AND DESTABILIZING) REVISIONS OF THE  
ECONOMIC DURESS DOCTRINE 
A. The Authors and Legal Doctrine 
As mentioned in the Introduction, I find no fault with these authors merely 
because they go beyond existing case law standards in their proposals. It is helpful, 
however, to determine just how far the authors depart from the foundational 
elements of current economic duress doctrine and to show the impact such variances 
have on the viability of their normative suggestions. 
While she uses some traditional duress terminology, Radin’s proposal has no link 
to case law. One example of this absence is her position that the focus for economic 
duress should shift from “expectation” to “exploitation.”115 The law, however, 
already takes this perspective into account: “the doctrine of economic duress is a 
                                                           
 111 See Mortensen v. Bresnan Commc’ns, LLC, 722 F.3d 1151, 1161 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(deeming a Montana doctrine of contractual mutual assent preempted because its “primary 
purpose” was to render arbitration agreements invalid at a “higher rate” than other contract 
terms).  
 112 “Ordinarily, common-law principles can invalidate an arbitration agreement, but not 
when based on a policy hostile to arbitration.” THI of N.M. at Hobbs Ctr., LLC v. Patton, 741 
F.3d 1162, 1170 (10th Cir. 2014). The court found sufficient evidence that New Mexico 
courts were hostile to arbitration by the passing comment in a New Mexico Court of Appeals 
regarding “subjecting the weaker party to arbitration.” Id. at 1168 (quoting Figueroa v. THI of 
N.M. at Casa Arena Blanca, LLC, 306 P.3d 480, 491 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012)). The Tenth 
Circuit said this brief passage “clearly evince[es] the view that having to arbitrate a claim is 
disadvantageous.” Id. at 1169. 
 113 See Dawson, supra note 4, at 233-35. 
 114 Allied–Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995).    
 115 RADIN, supra note 4, at 151. 
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‘last resort’ to correct exploitation of business exigencies ‘when conventional 
alternatives and remedies are unavailing.’”116   
Again, without case law support, she states that economic duress is “especially 
controversial” and “extremely contentious.”117 She argues, “[c]ourts could try to 
explain better what sort of terms [are economically coercive] and in particular what 
specific terms can give rise to economic duress.”118 Radin sees the victims of wealth 
disparity in the United States as being especially well-positioned to allege economic 
duress in their dealings with merchants.119 Therefore, Radin notes, the more 
frequently a practice is “normatively” unfair to the consumer that correspondingly 
makes out a stronger case for economic duress.120 
Kim accurately summarizes the case law elements of the common-law duress 
defense but proposes an “expansion” to “recognize the unique way in which 
electronic contracts can be used to force terms upon consumers who have no choice 
but to accept them.”121 Kim believes that electronic contracts are an “aberrant” 
vehicle because companies have exploited consumers “in a coercive manner” with 
“aggressive and oppressive terms.”122 She further faults the courts for how they have 
applied “doctrinal rules without considering the impact of the electronic form on the 
behavior of the parties.”123 However, Kim is careful to point out that her proposal 
for situational duress does not cover all forms of electronic contracting.124  
Thus, her proposal for reform makes duress “situational” and limited to where 
consumers are “uniquely vulnerable because of their interest in the relevant product 
or service.”125 Kim’s proposal does not rely on the current case law standards of the 
economic duress defense, and Kim acknowledges this fact.126 
Dawson says he accepts the common law’s requirement that a claimant to state a 
claim for duress must show “oppressive or coercive behavior.”127 Although he 
prefers an “expanded version” of duress to “loosen” or “suspend” the “wrongful act” 
requirement, he states that his proposal addressing “forced arbitration” satisfies the 
requirement for coercion and that his suggestion for expanding duress is “colorable 
                                                           
 116 Johnson v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 891 F. Supp. 522, 529 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (citing Rich 
& Whillock, Inc. v. Ashton Dev., Inc., 204 Cal. Rptr. 86, 90 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)). 
 117 RADIN, supra note 4, at 124, 151. 
 118 Id. at 151. 
 119 Id. 151-52. 
 120 Id. at 151-52. 
 121 Kim, supra note 4, at 278. 
 122 Id. at 266. 
 123 Id. at 267. 
 124 See id. at 279. 
 125 Id. at 278. 
 126 Kim, supra note 4, at 278-79 (noting that her “new” and “novel” defense is an 
“expansion” of existing doctrine and departs from prevailing principles by deeming the effect 
of duress is to make the contract “void” and not “voidable”). 
 127 Dawson, supra note 4, at 243. 
17Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2016
54 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:37 
 
under existing law.”128 Thus, Dawson believes that his re-engineered duress defense 
doctrine fits within existing case law boundaries. 
The following sections of this article will collect the sound principles that many 
jurisdictions enforce regarding economic duress applicable to arbitration agreements, 
but that Radin, Kim and Dawson omit or give short shrift. As will be seen, the 
authors’ suggestions are not maintainable as legitimate extensions of existing law 
because they are radical and destabilizing revisions of the common-law economic 
duress doctrine. 
B. The Policy of the Economic Duress Defense 
The duress defense has changed significantly from its early common law origins, 
where the defense was limited to actual imprisonment or physical harm to the 
offeree.129 Referring to "the modern doctrine of economic duress," commentators 
aptly have said the "doctrine is constantly being extended and expanded and bears 
slight resemblance to common-law duress."130 Today, most jurisdictions recognize 
economic duress (also called “business compulsion”) as a defense to contract 
enforcement or to support a cause of action for contract rescission.131  
Parties who enter into an agreement under duress have two remedies. They may 
either seek rescission of the agreement or they may affirm the agreement and sue for 
damages.132 Parties seeking to rescind the contract must be ready, willing, and able 
to return the consideration.133 Parties electing to affirm the contract and sue for 
damages are not required to return, or offer to return, the consideration they 
received.134 
Regarding the economic duress doctrine in contract cases, the Supreme Court 
observed “the word duress implies feebleness on one side, overpowering strength on 
the other.”135 The duress defense helps ensure that the offeree’s manifestation of 
assent reflects bona fide agreement of the bargain to the offeror.136 The term 
“manifested assent,” in the sense of external acts and conduct, is used advisedly 
                                                           
 128 Id. at 242-43. 
 129 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 9.2 (6th ed. 2009). For a 
comprehensive recital of the changing nature of duress, see Ford v. Engleman, 86 S.E. 852 
(Va. 1915). 
 130 28 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 
71:1 (4th ed. 2003). 
 131 See Finstad v. Ransom-Sargent Water Users, Inc., 849 N.W.2d 165, 169 (N.D. 2014) 
(citing 28 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 
71:7 (4th ed. 2003)).  
 132 Mutual Savs. Life Ins. Co. v. Osborne, 15 So.2d 713, 718 (Ala. 1943). 
 133 Ledbetter v. Frosty Morn Meats, 150 So.2d 365, 371 (Ala. 1963). 
 134 Coastal Concrete Co. v. Patterson, 503 So.2d 824, 830 (Ala. 1987); see also Solomon v. 
FloWarr Mgmt., 777 S.W.2d 701, 705 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989). 
 135 United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 300 (1942).  
 136 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.16 (3d ed. 2004); see also 
Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 83, 
120 (1996). 
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because “no testimony can show with certainty what the actual mental condition of 
the party was [at the time].”137 Duress also has an element that the actor act in 
defense of his property interests.138 
Accordingly, the policy for economic duress is:  
“[T]o discourage or prevent an individual in a stronger position, usually 
economic, from abusing that power . . . in a bargain situation.” Thus, the 
fundamental issue in duress cases is whether the statement which induced 
the agreement is the type of offer to deal that the law should discourage as 
oppressive and thus improper.139 
The three authors’ suggestions do not warrant a fundamental change in duress 
legal doctrine. To an extent, they misapprehend the nature of doctrinal change under 
the common law. While there is no doubt that “[t]he common law has an inherent 
capacity for growth and  change,”140 courts “particularly loath to indulge in the 
abrupt abandonment of settled principles and distinctions that have been carefully 
developed over the years.”141 “The persistent movement of the common law toward 
satisfying the needs of the times is soundly marked by gradualness.”142  Where a 
perceived need exists for “fundamental changes” in the law, they must be brought 
about sparingly and with deliberation,143 because “[p]redictability is an important 
component of our common law system.”144 Another concern is that while Dawson 
correctly states that the “precise elements of an economic duress claim vary from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction”145 another truism is that the wording varies less than the 
substance and most jurisdictions follow very similar foundational principles 
regarding the economic duress defense.146 The authors’ proposals undermine these 
values through a radical restructuring of common law economic duress.  
                                                           
 137 Wilkerson v. Bishop, 47 Tenn. 24, 28 (1869).  
 138 See Schlossberg v. E.L. Trendel & Assocs., 380 N.E.2d 950, 953 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) 
(explaining that compulsion, or duress, occurs “[w]here a person, to prevent injury to himself, 
his business or property, is compelled to make payment of money which the party demanding 
has no right to receive and no adequate opportunity is afforded the payor to effectively resist 
such demand”). 
 139 Richards v. Allianz Life Ins. Co., 62 P.3d 320, 327 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002) (alteration in 
original and citations omitted) (quoting First Nat’l Bank v. Sanchez, 815 P.2d 613, 616 (N.M. 
1991)). 
 140 15A AM. JUR. 2D Common Law § 2 (2014). 
 141 State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d 428, 445-46 (R.I. 2008) (quoting John T. 
Loughran, Some Reflections on the Role of Judicial Precedent, 22 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 8 
(1953)).   
 142 Falcone v. Middlesex Cty. Med. Soc’y, 170 A.2d 791, 799 (N.J. 1961). 
 143 Aranson v. Schroeder, 671 A.2d 1023, 1027 (N.H. 1995). 
 144 Hill v. Mayall, 886 P.2d 1188, 1191 (Wyo. 1994). 
 145 Dawson, supra note 4, at 243. 
 146 See LORD & WILLISTON, supra note 130, at § 71:19 (“There have been numerous 
formulations of the elements necessary to invoke the defense of economic duress or business 
compulsion, though all of them share certain basic characteristics.”). 
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C. Defining “Force,” “Coercion,” and “Oppression” 
Dawson, Radin, and Kim each indicate that a merchant who merely furnishes the 
consumer a contract that contains a forced arbitration clause meets the element of 
force, coercion, or oppression.147  Simply proposing a contract, however, is not what 
the law means by the “force,” “coercion,” or “oppression” needed to show economic 
duress. Instead, a complex body of law explains the circumstances evidencing the 
vendor’s use of force, coercion, or oppression to obtain a contract. These factors far 
exceed the depth of the explanations in the three commentaries.  
Duress is an improper persuasion technique that operates extrinsically to the 
contract terms. As the Georgia Court of Appeals has observed, “[d]uress must come 
from without, and not from within. It must be exerted by the other person or his 
agent, and can not be a creation of the mind of the person claiming his will has been 
restrained by fear.”148 Accordingly, the party proposing a contract must further 
commit “wrongful pressure”; that is, acts or threats, to induce the purported victim to 
accept the terms, such as by “extortive measures,” “compulsion,” or “improper or 
unjustified demands.”149 
The existence of economic pressure upon the offeree and even a threat of 
considerable financial loss absent contract acceptance are not necessarily “duress” 
for purposes of rendering a contract unenforceable.150 The same is true for the 
offeree’s fear of economic hardship or financial devastation.151 A good example of 
economic duress is where A threatens B, his former employee, that A will try to 
prevent B's employment elsewhere unless B agrees to release a claim that he has 
against A, and B, having no reasonable alternative to the threat, is thereby induced to 
make the contract.152  
When such economic stress occurs, it “must be attributable to the party against 
whom the duress is alleged.”153 The test for duress is based on “improper external 
pressure or influence”154  that operates on the “condition of the mind of the person 
                                                           
 147 See Dawson, supra note 4, at 242 (explaining that duress results merely from the vendor 
“proposing” an improper take it or leave it deal); RADIN, supra note 4, at 150-52 (indicating 
that the mere existence of such a contract is inherently coercive); Kim, supra note 4, at 283 
(“The introduction of an electronic contract . . . creates an improper threat in the sense that the 
company forces the consumer to accept or risk forfeiture of valuable goods or services.”). 
 148 Mabou v. Eller, 502 S.E.2d 760, 763 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting King v. Lewis, 4 
S.E.2d 464, 468 (Ga. 1939)). 
 149 See, e.g., Haston v. Crowson, 808 So. 2d 17, 22 (Ala. 2001). 
 150 Metcalf Constr. Co. v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 334, 347 (2011).  
 151 Cochran v. Ernst & Young, 758 F. Supp. 1548, 1556 (E.D. Mich. 1991).   
 152 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 99, at § 176 illus. 11; see also Massi v. Blue Cross & 
Blue Shield Mut. of Ohio, 765 F. Supp. 904, 909-10 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (finding a claim for 
economic duress where an employee, after learning his position was eliminated, was told to 
sign a waiver agreement or he would not receive severance benefits).  
 153 Chouinard v. Chouinard, 568 F.2d 430, 434 (5th Cir. 1978). 
 154 Gilley v. Gilley, 778 S.W.2d 862, 864 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989).   
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claiming the intimidation.”155 Economic duress must be based on conduct of the 
opposite party and not merely on the necessities of the purported victim.156 
The wrongfulness of the pressure or threat is a matter of degree and exists on a 
continuum. The gravity or magnitude of the threat in relation to the contract at issue, 
along with the resulting degree of unfairness, is a significant consideration. Thus, 
“[p]ressure may be considered wrongful when ‘it is so oppressive under given 
circumstances as to constrain one to do what his free will would refuse.’”157 
Economic duress also occurs where the offeror has exacted a “disproportionate 
exchange of values” (i.e., unfair consideration) between the parties.158 On the other 
hand, where the complaining party is challenging a contract term “that he could have 
been expected to agree to even if not under duress, the inference of duress is 
weakened, along with the further inference that duress caused whatever harm the 
victim is seeking to redress.”159 
A contract can be valid on its face even where the result of the bargain came 
from oppressive conduct of the offeror.160 “[T]here is nothing per se unconscionable 
about arbitration agreements.”161 Although “there is no line of absolute 
demarcation” between a threat that deprives a party of its free will as opposed to a 
threat that portends some lesser degree of harm, any “finding of duress at least must 
reflect a conviction that one party to a transaction has been so improperly imposed 
upon by the other that a court should intervene.”162   
Overlooking the above principles and constraints, the authors draw unworkable 
lines between legitimate bargaining techniques in a free-market society and the 
offeror’s intolerable coercion of offerees. A severe danger exists that the authors’ 
proposed expansions of the duress defense would apply where the plaintiff signed 
                                                           
 155 Windham v. Alexander, Weston & Poehner, P.C., 887 S.W.2d 182, 185 (Tex. App. 
1994). 
 156 See, e.g., Int’l Paper Co. v. Whildren, 469 So.2d 560, 563 (Ala. 1985) (“It is said that 
economic duress must be based on conduct of the opposite party and not merely on the 
necessities of the purported victim.”); see also McCord v. Goode, 308 S.W.3d 409, 413 (Tex. 
App. 2010) (“Duress must be shown from the acts or conduct of the party accused of duress, 
not the emotions of the purported victim.”). 
 157 Shanley & Fisher, P.C. v. Sisselman, 521 A.2d 872, 879 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1987) (quoting Rubenstein v. Rubenstein, 120 A.2d 11, 15 (N.J. 1956)); see also Wurtz v. 
Fleischman, 293 N.W.2d 155, 160 (Wis. 1980). 
 158 Gainey v. Gainey, 675 S.E.2d 792, 799 (S.C. Ct. App. 2009); see also RESTATEMENT, 
supra note 97, at § 176 cmt. a (“The fairness of the resulting exchange is often a critical factor 
in cases involving [such] threats.”); LORD & WILLISTON, supra note 130, at § 71:43 (“Where 
there is adequacy of consideration, there is generally no duress.”). 
 159 Prof’l Serv. Network, Inc. v. Am. All. Holding Co., 238 F.3d 897, 902 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(Posner, J.); see also In re Cheryl E., 207 Cal. Rptr. 728, 736 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (stating that 
a contract cannot be rescinded based on duress when evidence shows the offeree would have 
entered the contract notwithstanding the duress).  
 160 Cummings, Inc. v. Dorgan, 320 S.W.3d 316, 331 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) (“[A] contract, 
although valid on its face, may not be enforceable if it can be proved that the contracting party 
acted under duress.”). 
 161 EZ Pawn Corp. v. Mancias, 934 S.W.2d 87, 90 (Tex. 1996). 
 162 Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Louis Dreyfus Corp., 372 F.2d 753, 758 (2d Cir. 1967).   
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the contract “merely because he or she entered into it with reluctance, the contract 
was very disadvantageous to him or her, the bargaining power of the parties was 
unequal, or there was some unfairness in the negotiations preceding the 
agreement.”163 These circumstances, as well as an offeree’s mere “acquiescence” to 
the offeror, are insufficient.164 Another key limitation missing from the authors’ 
proposals is that a party may assert the affirmative defense of economic duress “only 
when the party against whom it is claimed was responsible for the claimant's 
financial distress.”165    
Again, the mere existence of the merchant’s superior bargaining position over the 
buyer is not automatic proof that the merchant further exerted wrongful pressure on 
the claimant.166   Briefly stated, the essence of duress is an improper threat that 
induces a “reasonably prudent person”167 to enter a contract against the latter’s 
better “judgment” and “desire.”168 All the above policies are needed to safeguard 
arbitration contracts given their central role in a properly functioning commercial-
law system. 
D. Economic Duress and Causation 
The three proposals do not address the element that the duress was the “sole and 
efficient cause” of the person’s entering the contract;169 if the person had an 
independent reason for accepting the deal duress is absent.170 “If the payment or 
exchange is made with the hope of obtaining gain, there is not duress; it must be 
solely for the purpose of protecting the victim's business or property interests.”171 
                                                           
 163 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 230 (2015). 
 164 See Coop. Res. Ctr., Inc. v. Se. Rural Cmty. Assistance Project, Inc., 569 S.E.2d 545, 
547 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002); see also Dunes Hosp., LLC v. Country Kitchen Int’l, Inc., 623 
N.W.2d 484, 489-91 (S.D. 2001). 
 165 Deer Creek Ltd. v. N. Am. Mortg. Co., 792 S.W.2d 198, 203 (Tex. App. 1990); accord 
Cheshire Oil Co., v. Springfield Realty Corp., 385 A.2d 835, 839 (N.H. 1978); see also Ariel 
Preferred Retail Grp., LLC v. CW Capital Asset Mgmt., 883 F. Supp. 2d 797, 820 (E.D. Mo. 
2012) (stating that a party's knowledge of the other party's financial pressures is irrelevant to 
the question of duress, because the financial necessity of a party, not caused by the other 
contracting party, does not constitute duress). 
 166 See Evans v. FedEx Express, No. W2013–01717–COA–R3–CV, 2014 WL 309351, at 
*4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2014). 
 167 Chellen v. John Pickle Co., 344 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1292 (N.D. Okla. 2004). 
 168 Delaney v. Chief of Police of Wareham, 539 N.E.2d 65, 70 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989). 
 169 Conagra Trade Grp., Inc. v. Fuel Expl., LLC, 636 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1173 (D. Colo. 
2009) (quoting Hastain v. Greenbaum, 470 P.2d 741, 747 (Kan. 1970)). “It is obvious that if 
some factor other than the wrongful act of which plaintiffs complain motivated them to enter 
into the . . . agreement, there was no duress.” Hous., Inc. v. Weaver, 246 S.E.2d 219, 225 
(N.C. Ct. App. 1978); cf. Rubenstein v. Rubenstein, 123 A.2d 67, 70-71 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. 
Div. 1956) (“[I]f it can be shown that the action sought to be avoided would not have taken 
place had it not been for the alleged coercive acts by the defendant, the transaction will be 
deemed to have been procured by duress, notwithstanding that it may be shown that there 
were other contributory, efficient causes of action sought to be avoided.”).  
 170 See S+L+H S.p.A. v. Miller-St. Nazianz, Inc., 988 F.2d 1518, 1528 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 171 Id. (quoting Pope v. Ziegler, 377 N.W.2d 201, 203 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985)). 
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Therefore, if the buyer wants to purchase the commodity, and has reservations about 
whether a contract term (such as required arbitration) is too onerous, duress will be 
absent when the buyer accepts the deal and his desire for the item overcomes his 
objection to the unfavorable term(s). 
Because the three proposals insufficiently acknowledge the element that the 
offeror—besides inviting the offeree’s contract acceptance—must have applied 
unlawful or improper pressure through “coercion” to “induce” the other party to 
enter the contract,172 their proposed reforms greatly dilute and even omit the driving 
element of the defense. There is no justification for a lesser standard in arbitration 
cases. 
E. Free Agency/State of Mind of the Victim 
The authors’ formulations inadequately cover the case-law standard that the 
actor’s threat or coercion has “practically destroy[ed] the free agency of a party”173 
or “induce[d] a fearful state of mind in the other party, which makes it impossible for 
[the party] to exercise his own free will.”174 This form of coercion induces the 
victim to sign a contract that he otherwise would not have accepted.175 Thus, the 
presence of economic duress means the absence of the victim’s “volition.”176   
As a practical matter, the victim of undue duress necessarily alleges that “the 
agreement was not signed voluntarily.”177 The bar is high because the law 
distinguishes lack of volition and the party’s difficult economic choices: “[T]he fact 
that a party faces a difficult choice—[such as] between additional benefits or 
pursuing his legal rights—does not alone indicate lack of free will.”178 To the same 
effect, the offeree’s mere annoyance, vexation, personal embarrassment, or the 
pressure of the circumstances does not deprive the party of his free will.179 
                                                           
 172 See Int’l Paper Co. v. Whilden, 469 So. 2d 560, 563 (Ala. 1985) (“Unless unlawful or 
unconscionable pressure is applied by the other party to induce the entering into a contract, 
there is not economic compulsion amounting to duress.”); see also Crossroads Ford Truck 
Sales, Inc. v. Sterling Truck Corp., 792 N.E.2d 488, 494 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (“‘Coercion’ and 
‘duress’ have essentially the same meaning: overpowering another's free will by imposition, 
oppression, or undue influence.”).  
 173 Holler v. Holler, 612 S.E.2d 469, 474 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005); accord T.G. v. Dep’t of 
Children & Families, 9 So.3d 48, 49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
 174 Noble v. White, 783 A.2d 1145, 1149 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001) (quoting Zebedeo v. 
Martin E. Segal Co., 582 F. Supp. 1394, 1417 (D. Conn. 1984)); see also Premier Farm 
Credit, PCA v. W-Cattle, LLC, 155 P.3d 504, 521 (Colo. App. 2006) (It must “clearly appear 
that the force or threats employed actually subjugated the mind and will of the person against 
whom they were directed . . . .”) (quoting Wiesen v. Short, 604 P.2d 1191, 1192 (Colo. 
1979)).  
 175 See Norton v. Mich. State Highway Dep’t, 24 N.W.2d 132, 135 (Mich. 1946); see also 
LORD &WILLISTON, supra note 130, at § 71:20. 
 176 See Cox & Floyd Grading, Inc. v. Kajima Const. Servs., 589 S.E.2d 789, 791 (S.C. Ct. 
App. 2003).  
 177 In re Estate of Hollett, 834 A.2d 348, 351 (N.H. 2003). 
 178 See EEOC v. Am. Express Publ’g Corp., 681 F. Supp. 216, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).   
 179 See Herget Nat’l Bank of Pekin v. Theede, 537 N.E.2d 1109, 1112 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989). 
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These last judicial principles suggest that the threat qualifies for duress only 
when it leaves the person with the absence of contracting capacity.180 “The ultimate 
fact in issue,” in a duress claim, “is whether the victim was bereft of the free exercise 
of his will power.”181 In effect, the duress overpowers the victim’s “will and 
inclination”182 and substitutes the wrongdoer’s will for the other party’s desires.183  
Kim and Dawson briefly mention the case law stating that duress is lacking when 
the consumer was not deprived of his free will when agreeing to arbitrate. However, 
it is clear these authors see no requirement for the destruction of the buyer’s “free 
agency” or “free will.”184 Radin does not mention the free will issue either way in 
her discussion of economic duress, but it is also plain that Radin sees no such 
requirement for a destruction of that capability.185 The three authors further 
overlook the possible injustice to the merchant when, despite the buyer’s later 
allegation of the merchant’s threats and coercive pressure, all the merchant can 
observe either in-person or through electronic communication, is a willing purchaser 
that signs the contract without complaint. These unambiguous external 
manifestations of assent are the essence of contract making186 and are equally 
applicable to arbitration contracts.187 As a result, the authors’ proposals undermine 
the principle that “the courts do not want to punish an innocent party who entered 
into the contract without any reason to suspect that the other party was subject to 
improper coercion.”188   
                                                           
 180 See id. at 1111 (stating that economic duress operates on the theory that party is deemed 
to have lacked mental capacity requisite to making of contract).    
 181 Aurora Bank v. Hamlin, 609 S.W.2d 486, 488 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (emphasis added); 
see also Alexander v. Standard Oil Co., 423 N.E.2d 578, 582 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (“To 
establish duress, one must demonstrate that the threat has left the individual ‘bereft of the 
quality of mind essential to the making of a contract.’”) (quoting Kaplan v. Kaplan, 182 
N.E.2d 706, 709 (Ill. 1962)); Yurek v. Shaffer, 678 S.E.2d 738, 746 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) 
(providing a good discussion of the factors indicating when the victim’s will has been 
overcome); Grace M. Giesel, A Realistic Proposal for the Contract Duress Doctrine, 107 W. 
VA. L. REV. 443, 470 nn.154-56 (2005) (extensive citations). But see RESTATEMENT, supra 
note 99, at § 175 cmt. b (criticizing the free will element because it is “vague and 
impracticable”). 
 182 See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Ramsey, 612 F. Supp. 326, 328 (E.D. Tenn. 1985). 
 183 See People ex rel. Carpentier v. Daniel Hamm Drayage Co., 161 N.E.2d 318, 321 (Ill. 
1959) (“Acts performed by a person under duress or compulsion are not to be attributed to his 
will. They are, in the eyes of the law, the result of another's will, for which the actor should 
not be held responsible.”). 
 184 See Dawson, supra note 4, at 244; Kim, supra note 4, at 283-86. 
 185 See RADIN, supra note 4, at 150-52. 
 186 See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text; cf. RESTATEMENT, supra note 99, at § 19 
cmt. c (“[E]ven though the intentional conduct of a party creates an appearance of assent on 
his part, he is not responsible for that appearance unless he knows or has reason to know that 
his conduct may cause the other party to understand that he assents.”) (emphasis added). 
 187 See, e.g., Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 119-20 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 188 LORD & WILLISTON, supra note 130, at § 71:8. 
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F. Duress: A Doctrine of Last Resort and a Policy to  
Safeguard Freedom of Contract 
The three authors’ expansion of duress runs counter to settled policy that 
economic duress is a “sparingly” invoked and “narrowly restricted” doctrine.189 
According to case law, it applies “only to special, unusual, or extraordinary 
situations in which [the actor] uses unjustified coercion . . . to induce a contract [with 
the victim.]”190 An overly liberal economic duress defense would make signed 
contracts of “little value” and thereby leave contracting relationships “in a confused 
and chaotic state.”191 Consistent with the legal doctrines noted above, case law 
indicates that courts are narrowly construing the economic duress defense.192 Put 
more succinctly, “the doctrine of economic duress is considered a doctrine of ‘last 
resort’"193—but that is not the Radin, Kim, or Dawson approach.    
The authors also fail to explore the ramifications of their hollowed-out duress 
defense for the overall commercial-law system. Although bona fide duress claims 
“occur very infrequently” in the legal world,194 the three proposals would 
substantially increase allegations of this duress defense. These proposals would 
incentivize the entire consumer population to seek contract rescission where 
consumers are strongly dissatisfied (actual or feigned) with “forced” arbitration. 
Dawson, Radin, and Kim apparently have no difficulty in potentially destabilizing 
every cable television contract, cell phone contract, insurance contract, and many 
other mass-market consumer contracts195 merely because the consumer strongly 
                                                           
 189 See In re Am. Int’l Grp., Consol. Derivative Litig., 976 A.2d 872, 885 (Del. Ch. 2009) 
(“Given that the doctrine of duress is usually asserted when a person knowingly violates a 
legal duty, courts rightly employ duress sparingly”); see also Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. 
Natarelli, 401 N.Y.S.2d 404, 409 (N.Y. Sup. 1977) (naming duress a “narrowly restricted 
defense”). Radin erroneously states that courts have narrowly construed duress “in the past.”  
RADIN, supra note 4, at 275 n.2. 
 190 E.g., Newburn v. Dobbs Mobile Bay, Inc., 657 So. 2d 849, 852 (Ala. 1995); Dunes 
Hosp., LLC, v. Country Kitchen Int’l,  623 N.W.2d, 484, 489 (S.D. 2001); see also In re 
Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., 519 B.R. 47, 58 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“[Under New York 
law], successful claims of economic duress are reserved for ‘extreme and extraordinary 
cases.’”) (quoting VKK Corp. v. Nat’l Football League, 244 F.3d 114, 123 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
 191 Nixon v. Leitman, 224 N.Y.S.2d 448, 467-68 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962). 
 192 See Giesel, supra note 181, at 463. Professor Giesel explains that in published state 
cases from 1996 through 2003, duress was discussed in eighty-eight cases, but in only nine of 
those cases did the court resolve the matter in favor of the duress claim. Id. Similarly, from 
1995 to 2003, only two federal appellate cases resulted in findings in favor of duress. Id. at 
464. Radin asserts that courts apply the economic duress defense “unpredictably.” RADIN, 
supra note 4, at 124. The statistics from the Giesel article, however, show that courts, 
predictably, reject the claim.  
 193 LORD & WILLISTON, supra note 130, at § 71:19.  
 194 See King v. Donnkenny, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 736, 738 (W.D. Va. 2000) (applying 
Virginia law).   
 195 See Dawson, supra note 4, at 246 (citing these contract types). Dawson considers these 
items necessities, and protected by the economic duress doctrine, but most courts state 
otherwise. See infra notes 242-249 and accompanying text. Because Kim’s proposal is more 
limited to instances of situational duress regarding aberrant electronic contracts, such as 
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believes an arbitration clause is oppressive. It must be remembered that “[r]escission 
is a harsh remedy, typically disfavored by the courts.”196  
Moreover, for Radin, Kim, and Dawson it appears that the party’s mere 
subjective dissatisfaction with pre-dispute arbitration would suffice to raise the 
defense, but the courts generally include both subjective and objective components 
to prevail on the defense. The subjective element is the party's personal reaction to 
circumstances, while objective elements are the reasonableness of the fear and 
unjustness of the injury based on how reasonable persons would react to the 
circumstances.197    
The three commentators also are seemingly unconcerned with the adverse impact 
of readily available rescission upon the legitimate interests of the vendors of goods 
and services, many of which are small businesses living on tight profit margins. The 
authors’ willingness to give numerous purchasers an easy exit strategy from their 
contracts and to leave a class of merchants potentially unable to cover their costs can 
only harm, not enhance, the economy.198 
A related reason why a properly calibrated economic duress defense is necessary 
for the commercial system is that courts must give breathing room to freedom of 
contract.199 “Freedom of contract” means parties have the right to bind themselves 
legally; it is a judicial concept that contracts are based on mutual agreement and free 
choice.200 Courts and commentators have observed,  
Freedom of contract is a “paramount public policy” that takes individual 
autonomy ‘seriously as a principle for ordering human affairs.’ It is the 
                                                           
“content hostage” situations, her proposal does not extend as far as Dawson’s or Radin’s. See 
Kim, supra note 4, at 282-85. 
 196 JDI Holdings, LLC v. Jet Mgmt., 732 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1231 (N.D. Fla. 2010). 
 197 Averette v. Indus. Concepts, Inc., 673 So.2d 642, 644 (La. Ct. App. 1996); see also 
Oskey Gasoline & Oil Co., v. Cont’l Oil Co., 534 F.2d 1281, 1286 (8th Cir. 1976); Dunes 
Hosp., LLC v. Country Kitchen Int’l, 623 N.W.2d 484, 490 (S.D. 2001). Some jurisdictions 
go further: “A duress defense is evaluated according to an objective standard.” Mathias v. 
Jacobs, 167 F. Supp. 2d 606, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); see also Allen v. Bd. of Trs. of Cmty. 
Coll. Dist. No. 508, 675 N.E.2d 187, 190 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996); Dockery v. Estate of Massey, 
958 S.W.2d 346, 348 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (noting that “economic duress” is so coercive and 
severe that person of ordinary firmness could not resist it). Still other jurisdictions make the 
test subjective. See Shanley & Fisher, P.C. v. Sisselman, 521 A.2d 872, 878 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1987) (“[T]he test for duress is subjective, rather than objective, and does not turn 
on whether the duress is of ‘such severity as to overcome the will of a person of ordinary 
firmness.’”) (quoting S.P. Dunham & Co. v. Kudra, 131 A.2d 306, 309 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1957)). For additional discussion of the “subjective/objective” test, see LORD & 
WILLISTON, supra note 130, at § 71:20.  
 198 The U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized the value of ensuring fairness to businesses 
facing increased liability. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752 
(2011) (approving an arbitration clause that bared class action relief because otherwise 
defendants could face a “devastating loss” with the undue risk that “defendants will be 
pressured into settling questionable claims”). 
 199 See Giesel, supra note 181, at 465-68 (noting role of freedom of contract in limiting the 
validity of the economic duress defense).   
 200 Freedom of Contract, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 779 (10th ed. 2014). 
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‘founding principle’ of the American economy, a ‘cherished’ value of the 
legal system, and a ‘vital part’ of contractual obligation. Perhaps even 
more importantly, it is a fundamental individual right, consistent with law 
and public policy, protected by the federal and many state constitutions, 
as well as by federal and state civil rights legislation and the [Uniform 
Commercial Code].201 
As one commentator points out, “[t]he reluctance with which courts find duress 
at all and the reluctance of courts to adopt an approach involving review of the 
substantive fairness of the deal suggests that courts of today are highly influenced by 
the notion of freedom of contract.” 202    
Numerous courts point to the need for freedom of contract by both buyer and 
seller because this concept promotes “the necessary certainty, stability and integrity 
of contractual rights and obligations.”203 An adequate duress doctrine thereby aids 
the autonomy of the individual parties and their ability to enjoy liberty of 
contract.204 Another aspect of the relation of economic duress and the freedom of 
contract is that “[c]ourts are reluctant to set aside agreements or to interfere with the 
freedom of contract because of the desirability of finality in private dispute 
resolutions.”205 As a result, the economic duress defense is limited whereby 
“ordinary hard bargaining is not only acceptable, but indeed, desirable, in our 
economic system, and should not be discouraged by the courts.”206 Absent any 
                                                           
 201 Steven W. Feldman, Autonomy and Accountability in the Law of Contracts: A Response 
to Professor Shiffrin, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 177, 220-22 (2009) (citing authorities). 
 202 Giesel, supra note 181, at 487 (emphasis added). 
 203 E.g., ARC LifeMed, Inc. v. AMC-Tenn., Inc., 183 S.W.3d 1, 26 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) 
(quoting McCall v. Carlson, 172 P.2d 171, 187-88 (Nev. 1946)); Rich & Whillock, Inc. v. 
Ashton Dev., Inc., 204 Cal. Rptr. 86, 90 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (“[Economic duress combat] 
exchanges make a mockery of freedom of contract and undermine the proper functioning of 
our economic system.”); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 99, at ch. 7 introductory note  
(“Contract law has traditionally relied in large part on the premise that the parties should be 
able to make legally enforceable agreements on their own terms, freely arrived at by the 
process of bargaining.”). 
 204 See Bagley v. Mt. Bachelor, Inc., 340 P.3d 27, 33 (Or. 2014) (“The right to contract 
privately is part of the liberty of citizenship, and an important office of the courts is to enforce 
contractual rights and obligations.”); see also Moyers v. City of Memphis, 186 S.W. 105, 109 
(Tenn. 1916) (“[I]f there is one thing which more than another public policy requires, it is that 
[persons] of full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, 
and that their contracts, when entered into freely and voluntarily, shall be held sacred, and 
shall be enforced by courts of justice.”) (cited approvingly in In re Baby, 447 S.W.3d 807 
(Tenn. 2014)); Orit Gan, Contractual Duress and Relations of Power, 36 HARV. J.L. & 
GENDER 171, 202 (2013) (“Duress doctrine should honor parties' autonomy and decisions but 
at the same time acknowledge their constraints.”). 
 205 Centric Corp. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 731 P.2d 411, 414 (Okla. 1986). In this regard, 
duress can be deemed a challenge to party autonomy because it allows a court to override the 
parties’ manifestation of assent based on the extrinsic misconduct of the offeror. See CHARLES 
FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 74 (1981). 
 206 LORD & WILLISTON, supra note 130, at § 71:7.  
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“legally cognizable restraint,” both parties remain “free to drive whatever bargain 
the market will bear.”207   
The question arises regarding the connection between freedom of contract, 
economic duress, and arbitral agreements. Freedom of contract has a long history 
with the Supreme Court208 and includes the Court’s emphasis on freedom of 
contract as the underlying policy of the FAA.209 As one author observes, the Court 
sees “[n]o contradiction or tension whatsoever between both efficient and resolution-
facilitative procedures, on the one hand, and freedom of contract, on the other.”210 
Instead, “the Court [has] embraced freedom of contract . . . both as a descriptive 
matter and as a normative one.”211 Thus, the Court’s FAA jurisprudence reflects the 
belief that “freedom of contract [is] essential for arbitration to realize its promise as 
an efficient dispute resolution procedure because of the parties’ need for procedural 
‘adaptability.’”212 A commentator concludes, “the FAA now stands for pure 
procedural freedom of contract.”213 Accordingly, freedom of contract is an 
important link between the economic duress defense and arbitration.  
Indeed, numerous state and federal court decisions expressly connect “freedom 
of contract” with the arbitral process. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has 
commented, “[i]t follows that a state law which limits freedom of contract with 
respect to arbitration agreements covered by the FAA conflicts with the FAA and is 
preempted by it.”214 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has opined, “freedom of 
contract [ensures] that parties are not required to submit to arbitration any dispute 
                                                           
 207 Cabot Corp. v. AVX Corp., 863 N.E.2d 503, 512 (Mass. 2007). 
 208 See, e.g., Gibbs v. Consol. Gas Co. of Balt., 130 U.S. 396, 408 (1889) (“[W]hile it is 
justly urged that those rules which say that a given contract is against public policy, [they] 
should not be arbitrarily extended so as to interfere with the freedom of contract . . . .”). 
 209 See 7 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 
§ 15:11 (4th ed. 2010) (“This freedom of contract ideal, resulting in substantial party 
autonomy concerning arbitration, was reiterated forcefully in the final arbitration decision of 
the Court's 1995 term, First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan [514 U.S. 938 (1995)].”); 7 
PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, JR., BRUNER & O'CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION LAW 
§ 21:43 (2014) (“The [Supreme Court’s] ‘freedom to contract’ message [in arbitration cases] 
is both inviting and forcefully stated.”) (analyzing Volt Info Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland 
Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 472 (1989)).  
 210 J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Public Law, 124 YALE L.J. 
3052, 3063 (2015).   
 211 Id.  
 212 Id. at 3064 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc, 473 U.S. 
614, 633 (1985)).  
 213 Id. at 3074 (citing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1743 (2011)); 
Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013)). Thus, the Court in Italian 
Colors emphasized that courts “rigorously enforce” the parties’ agreement as written. Italian 
Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2306. While no Supreme Court case was found expressly using the 
phrase “freedom of contract” or “liberty of contract” in its arbitration case law, the Court uses 
the rhetoric judges typically employ to support the freedom of contract. See id.; see also 
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1743.  
 214 Fahnestock & Co., v. Waltman, 935 F.2d 512, 520 (2d Cir. 1991). 
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which [they have] not agreed so to submit.”215 In another example, a U.S. District 
Court in Utah, citing Utah law, commented that “[w]e respect the parties' freedom to 
contract by enforcing arbitration agreements according to their terms and ensuring 
that arbitration proceedings are conducted in the manner to which the parties have 
agreed.”216 Many more examples exist exemplifying this judicial perspective and the 
decisions all vigorously support freedom of contract in matters of arbitration.217 
The judicial philosophy to support good faith and even hard bargaining in arbitral 
agreements is an important element of free market principles. Where a party in the 
American capitalist system through talent or diligence obtains market superiority 
over competitors or customers, the mere fact that the party in the arbitral setting has 
“intentionally gained market power with the purpose and intent of exercising 
leverage against its customers” does not show the merchant’s conduct “went beyond 
hard bargaining.”218 As stated by the Second Circuit,  
 Because an element of economic duress is thus present when many 
contracts are formed or releases given, the ability of a party to disown his 
obligations under a contract or release on that basis is reserved for 
extreme and extraordinary cases. Otherwise, the stronger party to a 
contract or release would routinely be at risk of having its rights under the 
contract or release challenged long after the instrument became 
effective.219 
Insofar as the weaker party in many, if not in almost all, contract negotiations 
could potentially claim duress because of the parties’ disparity in power, and thereby 
readily disown his obligations and disrupt the economy, courts will strictly construe 
the defense against the party asserting it.220 Consistent with this rule, the party 
seeking to void a contract because of economic duress “shoulders a heavy 
                                                           
 215 Chelsea Family Pharmacy v. Medco Health Sols., 567 F.3d 1191, 1196 (10th Cir. 2009). 
216  Roberts v. Cent. Refrigerated Serv., 27 F. Supp. 3d 1256, 1259 (D. Utah 2014). 
 217 E.g., Kitsap Cty. Deputy Sheriff's Guild v. Kitsap County, 219 P.3d 675, 678 (Wash. 
2009) (“Reviewing an arbitration decision for mistakes of law or fact would call into question 
the finality of arbitration decisions and undermine alternative dispute resolution. Further, a 
more extensive review of arbitration decisions would weaken the value of bargained for, 
binding arbitration and could damage the freedom of contract.”); Miller v. Miller, 707 N.W.2d 
341, 345 (Mich. 2005) (noting that the parties decide the scope of arbitration, and a court may 
not “infringe[ ] on the parties' recognized freedom to contract for binding arbitration.”); L & R 
Realty v. Conn. Nat’l Bank, 715 A.2d 748, 753 (Conn. 1998) (“Arbitration agreements 
illustrate the strong public policy favoring freedom of contract and the efficient resolution of 
disputes.”); Feinberg v. Boros, 951 N.Y.S.2d 110, 120 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (“[F]reedom of 
contract dictates that parties to an arbitration should be free to contract to the scope of that 
arbitration, including the reach of the arbitral decision.”). 
 218 Cf. Cabot Corp. v. AVX Corp., 863 N.E.2d 503, 512, 514 n.6 (Mass. 2007); see also 
Dunes Hosp., LLC v. Country Kitchen Int’l, 623 N.W.2d 484, 490 (S.D. 2001) (“All 
negotiations inherently involve a certain amount of pressure and coercion.”). 
 219 VKK Corp. v. Nat’l Football League, 244 F.3d 114, 123 (2d Cir. 2001) (emphasis 
added).   
 220 See id. at 124; see also Cabot Corp., 863 N.E.2d at 512. 
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burden”221 to prove his case by “clear and convincing evidence.”222 No reason 
exists to construe arbitration contracts under a different standard. Another doctrine 
counseling a narrow interpretation of the duress defense in arbitration cases is the 
rule that courts in construing arbitral contracts “should apply ordinary state-law 
principles that govern the formation of contracts.”223 Radin’s, Kim’s, and Dawson’s 
proposals inadequately acknowledge these public policies.224 Because the proposed 
suggestions to expand the duress defense beyond exceptional circumstances violate 
the usual state-law principles the proposals deprive arbitration agreements of the 
“equal footing” guarantee.225 
G. The Duress Defense: Is the Contract Void or Voidable? 
Dawson and Radin apparently accept settled doctrine that “even where a party is 
subject to duress, the resulting contract is voidable, not void.”226 The difference 
between a “void” and “voidable” contract is that with the former, no contract ever 
came into being and is incapable of enforcement, but with the latter, the victim has 
the choice of denying the existence of the agreement or of affirming the contract and 
being bound by the terms.227 
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts observes, 
The distinction between a “void contract” and a voidable contract has 
important consequences. For example, a victim of duress may be held to 
                                                           
 221 Davis & Assocs. v. Health Mgmt. Servs., 168 F. Supp. 2d 109, 114 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).  
 222 Giesel, supra note 181, at 468 n.147 (2005) (citing decisions). 
 223  First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995); see also Comer v. 
Micor, Inc., 436 F.3d 1098, 1104 n.11 (9th Cir. 2006).  
 224 Radin subscribes to the freedom of contract as a “core value” but argues extensively that 
the current system of adhesion contracting has eradicated this freedom because she sees a 
system of involuntary divestment of consumer rights. See RADIN, supra note 4, at 3, 19, 56. 
Kim briefly mentions that the economic duress defense protects the freedom of contract but 
does not explain why her proposed dilution of the duress defense is consistent with this core 
value. Kim, supra note 4, at 278. Dawson makes no mention of the freedom of contract. 
Freedom of contract, however, can co-exist with adhesion contracts. See Bailey v. Lincoln 
Gen. Ins., 255 P. 3d 1039, 1047 (Colo. 2011) (insurance policies); see also Forecast Homes, 
Inc. v. Steadfast Ins., 105 Cal. Rptr. 3d 200, 210 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010). 
 225 Dawson states that the decisions are generally “hostile” to claims of economic duress 
and praises those “few” cases that are “receptive” to the defense. Dawson, supra note 4, at 
244. In point of fact, the cases that Dawson criticizes as failing to understand “the realities on 
the ground” analyze at length—and correctly apply—the legal standards for economic duress. 
See id. at 244 n.64 (citing decisions). As for the three cases that Dawson cites as being 
“receptive,” Dawson acknowledges that the Texas case was reversed on appeal. See In re RLS 
Legal Sol., LLC, 156 S.W.3d 160 (Tex. App. 2005), rev’d, 221 S.W.3d 629, 632 (Tex. 2007). 
In the Alabama case cited, the court “made no findings of fact” and therefore it was 
impossible to tell if economic duress was present at all. Ex parte Early, 806 So. 2d 1198, 1202 
(Ala. 2001). The only valid citation he provides is a Massachusetts case, ITT Commercial Fin. 
Corp. v. Tyler, No. 917660, 1994 WL 879497, at *5-7 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 1994), 
which addresses a common pattern of economic duress. 
 226  See Mandavia v. Columbia Univ., 912 F. Supp.2d 119, 128 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 227 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 99, at § 7.  
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have ratified the contract if it is voidable, but not if it is “void.” 
Furthermore, a good faith purchaser may acquire good title to property if 
he takes it from one who obtained voidable title by duress but not if he 
takes it from one who obtained “void title” by duress.228 
This decision is at the election of the victim, who might decide that 
notwithstanding the offeror’s coercion, the victim desires the freedom of contract to 
ratify the transaction.229 Thus, courts have said, “[a] party may ratify a contract or 
release entered into under duress by ‘intentionally accepting benefits under the 
contract.’”230 Indeed, courts have gone so far as to say that “[a] party who fails to 
promptly challenge an agreement on the ground of duress waives the defense.”231  
Sound reasons exist why a contract induced by economic duress is voidable and 
not void. “[J]ust as in the case of fraud, mistake, undue influence, and other 
invalidating causes, there is an actual and intended expression of assent by the victim 
to the transaction in question, [even] though [how] . . . the assent was obtained 
make[s] it inequitable to [mandate] the enforcement of the resulting bargain.”232 
Therefore, based on the external acts of the parties, which is the basis for the 
contract, the requisites for a binding agreement are present if the offeree chooses to 
accept the deal and withdraw his earlier manifested non-concurrence.233 On the 
other hand, if the victim of duress changes his mind and wishes to obtain the benefit 
of the contract imposed by the other party, a rule disallowing this choice would rob 
the offeree of his freedom of contract to ratify the agreement.   
The above discussion is also in line with the rule that when a serious question 
exists about the validity of a contract, the agreement should be voidable instead of 
void whenever possible. In a related area, courts have said, “[i]n circumstances 
where public policy imposes limitations on the freedom of contract, [courts] are 
                                                           
 228 Id. at § 174 cmt. B, cmt. d; see also LORD & WILLISTON, supra note 130, at § 71:8 
(stating the general rule that a contract procured through duress is “voidable” and not “void”). 
The authorities do provide that an act of physical duress could render an arbitration agreement 
void, but such allegations are extremely rare. See Farnsworth v. Towboat Nantucket Sound, 
Inc., 790 F.3d 90, 97 (1st Cir. 2015). 
 229 See Anselmo v. Mfrs. Life Ins., 771 F.2d 417, 420 (8th Cir. 1985); see also DiMartino 
v. City of Hartford, 636 F. Supp. 1241, 1252 (D. Conn. 1986); Willms Trucking Co., v. JW 
Constr. Co., 442 S.E.2d 197, 202 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994). 
 230 VKK Corp. v. Nat’l Football League, 244 F.3d 114, 123 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting In re 
Boston Shipyard Corp., 886 F.2d 451, 455 (1st Cir. 1989)). 
 231 Acquaire v. Canada Dry Bottling, 906 F. Supp. 819, 828 (E.D.N.Y. 1995); see also New 
Orleans Flooring Supply, Inc. v. Kentile Floors, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 8158, 1994 WL 97505, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 1994) (“A contract signed under duress is not void but voidable, and a 
party must move quickly or the defense is deemed waived and the contract ratified”); Port 
Chester Elec. Constr. Corp. v. Hastings Terraces, Inc., 284 A.D. 966, 967 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1954). 
 232 LORD & WILLISTON, supra note 130, at § 71:8. 
 233 3 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 
7:37 (4th ed. 1992) (“The only justification for enforcement of the modified undertaking . . . 
seems to be the apparent voluntariness of the promisor in freely uttering [his] new promise . . . 
.”). 
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well-advised to wield a scalpel rather than a sledgehammer.”234 Emphasizing 
freedom of contract policies, an Illinois court observed, 
The courts are reluctant to restrict the freedom of citizens to make their 
own agreements. Declaring a contract void and unenforceable is a power 
the courts therefore exercise sparingly. An agreement will not be held 
void, as being contrary to public policy, unless it is “clearly contrary to 
what the constitution, the statutes or the decisions of the courts have 
declared to be the public policy or unless [it is] manifestly injurious to the 
public welfare.”235 
All the above principles have equal resonance in the arbitral setting. Because 
arbitration agreements occupy such a central role in the American economy, they 
deserve “equal footing” on this issue.  
Kim travels an unusual path on this “void/voidable” point. In her proposal, she 
states that “[u]nlike traditional duress, a finding of situational duress would render a 
contract void and not merely voidable.”236 She indicates that consumers are 
“uniquely vulnerable” because of their great interest in the relevant product or 
service.237 Therefore, the “contract” should be void because of the strong possibility 
that a consumer could be entrapped into contractual liability based on external 
conduct evidencing implied ratification.238 This argument, however, is not 
persuasive. The better view is to leave the choice to the individual under the freedom 
of contract to seek out the proper advice and to affirm or disaffirm the original 
coercive transaction. Where the law allows the parties to make the transaction 
voidable, this choice holds out the possibility that parties can repair their bargain and 
lessens the potential for economic disruption, which is a policy objective equally 
pertinent to arbitration agreements.  
H. Duress and the “Necessaries of Modern Life” 
Radin is content to leave unexplained her statement that recipients could 
experience a form of duress “when presented with take it or leave it boilerplate in 
acquiring a necessity of life.”239  Kim does not address whether her proposal covers 
the victim’s necessaries. Under Dawson’s proposal, the coercion element is met 
when the actor’s proposal would cause the second party to “forego something that a 
reasonable person would deem necessary for modern life.” 240 Unfortunately, 
                                                           
 234 Baugh v. Novak, 340 S.W.3d 372, 384 (Tenn. 2011). 
 235 In re M.M.D., 820 N.E.2d 392, 399 (Ill. 2004) (quoting H&M Commercial Driver 
Leasing, Inc. v. Fox Valley Containers, Inc., 805 N.E.2d 1177, 1180 (Ill. 2004)). 
 236 Kim, supra note 4, at 266, 278. 
 237 Id. 
 238 Id. at 278.  
 239 RADIN, supra note 4, at 275 n.2.  
 240 Dawson, supra note 4, at 242. In a later passage, Dawson restates the proposed coercion 
element as what would would cause the victim to “forego some commodity that is necessary 
to live in the twenty-first century.” Id. at 244.  The two versions differ in that the second test 
omits the requirement for a “reasonable” person’s deprivation and that it transforms the 
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Dawson does not explain the criteria for how a particular commodity would meet 
this standard. Does the phrase “necessary for modern life” refer to the usual legal 
definition of “necessaries?” Also, does he mean to include some or all of the 
following commodities that he appears to link to his standard, which include 
“internet service providers,” “public utility,” “hospital” services, “airline” service, 
“cellular phone” service, “brokerage for a retirement account,” “nursing home,” 
“cable television,” and “credit cards”?241 Most importantly, how does Dawson’s 
proposal categorize arbitration agreements—do all or most of them come within the 
definition of “necessaries?” 
Numerous problems exist with this element of Radin’s and Dawson’s proposed 
test. First, one accepted meaning of “necessaries” is “things that are indispensable to 
living,” which include “whatever food, medicine, clothing, shelter and personal 
services usually considered reasonably essential for the preservation of life.”242 If 
Radin’s and Dawson’s intent is to rely on the accepted meaning of “necessaries,” 
then cellular phone service,243 cable television service,244 and personal 
computers245 are outside the definition. Similarly, brokerage for retirement accounts 
and breakfast cereals should also be excluded because they are not “necessary for 
modern life.”   
A second, more liberal definition of “necessaries” also exists. This standard 
covers whatever is reasonably needed for subsistence, health, comfort and education, 
considering the person’s age, station in life and medical condition.246 Excluded from 
this definition is anything purely ornamental, anything solely for pleasure, anything 
the person already has been furnished, anything that concerns his estate or business 
beyond personal needs, and borrowed money.247  This second standard goes beyond 
the first one by considering the person’s personal attributes. If this standard is 
Radin’s and Dawson’s intent, do they propose that courts conduct a searching 
inquiry into to the victim’s personal needs and station in life so that the very well-off 
could be entitled to more protection than the average person? In this regard, case law 
provides that a “necessary” item for a multi-millionaire’s lavish lifestyle could 
                                                           
concept “modern life” into the “twenty-first century.” This Article assumes that Dawson 
meant to incorporate a “reasonable person’s” perspective for both versions. 
 241 Id. at 242-47. 
 242 Necessaries, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1192 (10th ed. 2014). 
 243 See Halprin v. Verizon Wireless Serv., No. 07-4015, 2008 WL 961239, at *7 (D.N.J. 
Apr. 8, 2008); see also Stiener v. Apple Comput., Inc., 556 F. Supp.  2d 1016, 1027 (N.D. Cal. 
2008) (finding iPhone is not a necessity); Riensche v. Cingular Wireless LLC, No. C06-
1325Z, 2007 WL 3407137, at *8 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 9, 2007); Dreyfus v. Ameritech Mobile 
Commc’ns., 700 N.E.2d 162, 167 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998); Butcher v. Ameritech Corp., 727 
N.W.2d 546, 554 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006). 
 244 See Smith v. Prime Cable of Chi., 658 N.E.2d 1325, 1333 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). 
 245 See Provencher v. Dell, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1202 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
 246 See Necessaries, supra note 242, at 1192; see also Walter v. Palisades Collection, LLC, 
Civil Action No. 06–378, 2011 WL 1666869, at *4 (E.D. Pa. May 2, 2011) (noting that this 
standard is broader than the bare essentials needed “to hold body and soul together”). 
 247 See Necessaries, supra note 242, at 1192; see also Walter, 2011 WL 1666869, at *4.  
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include a chauffeured limousine, a private chef, a mink coat, and even whale meat 
and caviar.248  
If the second standard is the intent, the intrusion into the individual’s lifestyle 
and the potential for defendants to harass plaintiffs about their life choices is plain. 
In any event, courts should construe “necessaries” “as closely as possible” (just like 
economic duress itself) so as to preclude opening the door to a broad class of 
contracts for items that are merely useful and to avoid destroying the “necessaries” 
classification altogether.249 By leaving the concept “deemed necessary” so open-
ended, Radin and Dawson provide inadequate guidance to the bench and bar on 
covered versus uncovered commodities, a problem equally pertinent to arbitration 
agreements. 
I. Effect of the Offeror’s Good Faith, Legally Permissible Negotiating Position  
Courts accept that a wrongful threat for purposes of economic duress is lacking if 
the actor has a “good faith belief” that his negotiating position is a “plausible one” 
under the circumstances.250 The merchant’s mere use of non-negotiable arbitral 
boilerplate is morally blameless because courts properly reason that “the very 
ubiquity of the practice precludes a conclusion that the use of a nonnegotiable 
contract, on its own, is in any way unethical.”251  Similarly, most courts say “it is not 
duress to threaten to take action which is legally permissible.”252 These principles 
stem from the concept that “[a]n intentional wrongful act is an essential element of a 
claim for duress.”253 Radin gives little attention to this doctrinal point about the 
economic duress defense. While Kim mentions the wrongful act requirement of 
duress at length in her article,254 she does not connect it with arbitration contracts. 
                                                           
 248 See Necessaries, supra note 242, at 1192; see, e.g., Gimbel Bros. v. Pinto, 145 A.2d 865 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1958) (mink coat); Bloomingdale Bros. v. Benjamin, 112 N.Y.S. 2d 33 (N.Y. 
Civ. Ct. 1951) (whale meat and caviar). 
 249 See 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 
§ 9:19 (4th ed. 2009). 
 250 See, e.g., Happ v. Corning, Inc., 466 F.3d 41, 45 (1st Cir. 2006); Zebedeo v. Martin E. 
Segal Co., 582 F. Supp. 1394, 1417 (D. Conn. 1984) (“[W]here one party insists upon a 
contractual provision, which it honestly believes itself entitled to, unless such belief is patently 
unreasonable, conduct cannot be wrongful, and thus, cannot constitute duress.”); River Bank 
Am. v. Diller, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790, 804 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that duress will be 
absent merely because one party in good faith mistakenly takes a different view of contract 
rights from the other party). 
 251 Vasquez v. Greene Motors, Inc., 154 Cal. Rptr. 3d 778, 787 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013). 
 252 Kamerman v. Steinberg, 891 F.2d 424, 432 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting Hammelburger v. 
Foursome Inn Corp., 431 N.E.2d 278, 285 n.4 (N.Y. 1981)); see also Redmon v. McDaniel, 
540 S.W.2d 870, 872 (Ky. 1976) (“[I]t is not duress to threaten to do what one has a legal 
right to do, nor is it duress to threaten to take any measure authorized by law and the 
circumstances of the case.”); cf. City of Scottsbluff v. Waste Connections of Neb., Inc., 809 
N.W.2d 725, 744 (Neb. 2011) (“Lawful coercion becomes impermissible when employed to 
support a bad-faith demand: one that the party asserting it knows (or should know) to be 
unjustified.”). 
 253 Free Spirit Aviation, Inc. v. Rutherford Airport Auth., 664 S.E.2d 8, 12 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2008). 
 254 Kim, supra note 4, at 276-78, 281-82.  
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The proceeding discussion focuses on the Dawson proposal, which comes closest of 
the three commentaries to addressing this connection.   
One of Dawson’s main concerns about arbitration agreements is to protect 
employees from perceived employer overreaching.255 Contrary to Dawson’s 
assertions, the near-unanimous weight of authority says it is not economic duress 
where an employer refuses to grant or continue a person’s employment unless the 
employee agrees to waive his statutory right to litigate an employment dispute in 
court.256 As a New Jersey court remarked, “courts that have considered this issue 
have consistently determined that the economic coercion of obtaining or keeping a 
job, without more, is insufficient to overcome an agreement to arbitrate statutory 
claims.”257 Along the same lines, commentators have confirmed that “[d]uress 
claims also fail because employers have the legal right to mandate arbitration as a 
condition of employment, and employees have the free will to refuse employment or 
quit if they do not wish to be bound.”258  
Furthermore, Dawson is incorrect that the employee will be the victim of duress 
where the employer imposes the choice of continuing employment or “waiv[ing] her 
right to litigate employment disputes before a court or an administrative agency.”259 
As courts have commented, “[a] prospective, voluntary agreement to proceed to 
arbitration with a [statutory right of action] does not amount to an employee 
‘foregoing,’ or waiving, statutory rights.”260 Rather, “by agreeing to arbitrate, a 
party ‘trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the 
simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.’”261 Even more misleading is 
Dawson’s argument that the employer commits a wrongful act in compelling a 
prospective employee to choose between employment and waiver of the ability to 
litigate a possible dispute in court.262 Courts have said, “[i]f [the applicant] 
disagreed with anything contained in the application she was free to simply look 
elsewhere for employment. . . . When a party . . . voluntarily agrees to something in 
                                                           
 255 See Dawson, supra note, 4, at 243 (commenting extensively). 
 256 Id. (citing this circumstance as constituting duress). See generally Jay M. Zitter, 
Annotation, What Constitutes Duress by Employer or Former Employer Vitiating Employee's 
Release of Employer from Claims Arising out of Employment, 79 A.L.R. 6th 377 (2012). 
 257 See Quigley v. KPMG Peat Marwick, LLP, 749 A.2d 405, 412 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2000) (citing cases). 
 258 Stephen A. Plass, Mandatory Arbitration as an Employer’s Contractual Prerogative: 
The Efficiency Challenge to Equal Employment Opportunity, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 195, 220 
(2011); see Cooper v. MRM Inv., 367 F.3d 493 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that the district court 
erred in refusing to compel arbitration where an employee was required to sign arbitration 
agreement as a condition of employment); see also Hathaway v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 711 S.W.2d 
227, 229 (Tex. 1986) (“[W]hen the employer notifies an employee of changes in employment 
terms, the employee must accept the new terms or quit.”). 
 259 Dawson, supra note 4, at 243. 
 260 EEOC v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 500, 503 (E.D. Mich. 1997), 
rev’d on other grounds, 177 F.3d 448 (6th Cir. 1998). 
 261 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (quoting Mitsubishi 
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626–28 (1985)). 
 262 See Dawson, supra note 4, at 244-45. 
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an attempt to obtain employment they are not being ‘forced’ to do anything.”263 
Therefore, Dawson’s argument that the waiver of a statutory right is equal to an 
agreement to arbitrate is unconvincing. 
Dawson has overlooked his best counter-argument in addressing the employee 
discharge scenario. In a widely cited illustration, the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts indicates that the threat of employee discharge can constitute duress where  
A makes a threat to discharge B, his employee, unless B releases a claim 
that he has against A. The employment agreement is terminable at the will 
of either party, so that the discharge would not be a breach by A. B, 
having no reasonable alternative, releases the claim. A's threat is a breach 
of his duty of good faith and fair dealing, and the release is voidable by 
B.264 
According to the case law, however, this illustration applies only where a 
contract exists between A and B, and does not apply when there is employment at 
will.265 The majority rule is that employment at will unaccompanied by a bilateral 
contract does not include the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.266 
Because the vast majority of American workers operate under employment at 
will,267 the Restatement illustration would provide only limited assistance to 
Dawson’s argument. Another obstacle to an employee’s successful invocation of 
economic duress is that “people want to eat first and consider legal and philosophical 
implications later. The average worker in need of a job is unlikely at the outset to 
balk at an arbitration clause.”268 It bears emphasis, however, that duress should be 
absent even with employment at will because all workers inherently face such 
pressure with any decision to leave or stay at his job if a worker is dissatisfied with 
his employer. 
Dawson next argues it will be economic duress where a merchant refuses to 
provide the consumer an “essential service” unless the consumer agrees to arbitrate 
                                                           
 263 Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, 966 F. Supp. at 504 (emphasis in original); accord Cooper, 
367 F.3d at 504. 
 264 RESTATEMENT, supra note 99, at § 176 cmt. e, illus. 11. 
 265 See, e.g., DeJean v. United Airlines, Inc., 839 P.2d 1153, 1160 (Colo. 1992) (noting the 
Restatement illustration concerns a threat to breach a contract).   
 266 See Suburban Hosp., Inc. v. Dwiggins, 596 A.2d 1069, 1077 (Md. 1991) (“To the extent 
that we are asked to impose a general requirement of good faith and fair dealing in at-will 
employment situations, we decline the invitation. ‘[A] small number of courts have implied a 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing into employment contracts . . . . The majority of courts 
confronting the issue, however, have refused on both policy and analytical grounds to imply 
any version of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing into [at will] employment 
contracts.’”) (quoting Peter Stone Partee, Note, Reversing the Presumption of Employment at 
Will, 44 VAND. L. REV. 689, 699 (1991)); see also Green v. Medco Health Sols. of Tex., LLC, 
947 F. Supp. 2d 712, 732 (N.D. Tex. 2013) (“The general rule provides that a duty of good 
faith and fair dealing cannot arise from an at-will employment relationship.”). 
 267 E.g., Marian K. Riedy & Kim Sperduto, At-Will Fiduciaries? The Anomalies of a “Duty 
of Loyalty” in the Twenty-First Century, 93 NEB. L. REV. 267, 268 (2014). 
 268 Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Better Approach to Arbitrability, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1377, 1387 
(1991). 
36https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol64/iss1/6
2015] PRE-DISPUTE ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 73 
 
all disputes arising from a non-negotiable contract.269 To the contrary, a provider of 
essential or necessary services can properly employ an adhesion contract that 
mandates the consumer accept arbitration. A couple prime examples are pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements for nursing home270 or doctor-patient271 services. Indeed, it 
would violate the FAA for a state to fence off essential or necessary consumer 
services from the FAA. As stated by the Supreme Court, “when state law prohibits 
outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim, the analysis is straightforward: 
The conflicting rule is displaced by the FAA.”272 On the other hand, a particular 
contract for necessary services can result from duress under the particular 
circumstances.273 
The above employee discharge scenario shows the linkage between the 
bargaining between two economic actors and freedom of contract. Most instances, 
such as where the employer gives the employee the choice of discharge or accepting 
an arbitration agreement, or where a merchant asks the consumer to decide between 
forgoing a purchase or accepting arbitration as part of the sale, concern valid free 
market activity. Generally, these circumstances are the antithesis of duress because 
they merely ask the offeree to select between “perfectly legitimate alternatives.”274 
“Furthermore, a seller’s refusal to perform unless a buyer signs an arbitration 
agreement is not economic duress against the latter, at least where the buyer will not 
suffer a forfeiture by refusing to sign, since the seller has the legal right to refuse to 
sell under that circumstance.”275  
Finally, Dawson argues that there is a line of cases that “[states] a company’s 
status as the sole supplier of a particular product may subject the company to 
economic duress claims in certain circumstances.”276 Dawson misreads these cases. 
                                                           
 269 See Dawson, supra note 4, at 243.  
 270 Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1203-04 (2012). 
 271 Buraczynski v. Eyring, 919 S.W.2d 314, 318 (Tenn. 1996). 
 272 Brown, at 1203-1204 (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 
1747 (2011)); see also Buraczynski, 919 S.W.2d at 318 (finding that doctor-patient arbitration 
agreement in an adhesion contract not automatically unenforceable under the Tennessee 
Uniform Arbitration Act). 
 273 Cf. Covenant Health & Rehab. of Picayune, LP v. Lumpkin, 23 So. 3d 1092, 1098 
(Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (recognizing this possibility). 
 274 LORD &WILLISTON, supra note 130, at § 71:14.  
Simply because the alleged victim is faced with a variety of options, none of which is 
especially good and, indeed, all of which are bad, does not give rise to duress; as long 
as there are some reasonable, though unpalatable, alternatives, the alleged victim has a 
choice, and duress will not be found. 
Id. at §71:40.   
 275 6 C.J.S. Arbitration § 30 (2015). The seller’s right to refuse to sell is subject to the 
antitrust laws, though. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) (“In 
absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the [Sherman Act] does not restrict 
the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, 
freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal . . . .”); 
see also Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 276 Dawson, supra note 4, at 245-47. 
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Instead, they stand for the accepted doctrine that “a threatened breach constitutes 
duress where the failure to receive the promised performance will result in 
irreparable injury to the business.”277 To illustrate this point, economic duress will 
be absent where party A (without otherwise being oppressive or abusive) threatens 
party B that A will exercise rights that are legally available to A.278 No reason exists 
why the rules cited above should differ with an arbitration agreement.  
J. Availability of an Alternative Remedy 
Radin’s proposal to expand the duress defense does not satisfactorily accept the 
consistently applied rule that if the purported victim has the alternative of “an 
adequate legal remedy,” economic duress is absent.279 The same critique applies to 
Kim’s proposal280 and Dawson’s proposal281 for economic duress dilution.  
Case law indicates that the claimant must show that he had no feasible alternative 
legal remedy as an element of the action or defense of economic duress.282 The 
prevailing rule is that, 
[i]n making the determination whether a plaintiff who asserts a duress 
claim had a reasonable alternative available, the courts employ an 
objective test that considers all of the circumstances surrounding the 
                                                           
 277 LORD & WILLISTON, supra note 130, at § 71:41. Compare Thomas Constr. Co. of Mo. v. 
Kelso Marine, Inc., 639 F.2d 216, 220 n.4 (5th Cir. 1981) (a general contractor in executing a 
purchase order was under economic duress in that the only alternative source of concrete 
would be for it to set up its own batch plant and such would be economically prohibitive), 
with In re Nat’l Steel Corp., 316 B.R. 287, 310 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004) (finding that a sole 
supplier’s mere refusal to deal with a customer because the customer will not accept the 
supplier’s terms is not economic duress).  
 278 See, e.g., Choksi v. Shah, 8 So. 3d 288, 293-94 (Ala. 2008) (“It is never duress to do 
that which a party has a legal right to do.”) (quoting Neuberger v.  Preferred Accident Ins. 
Co., 89 So. 90, 92 (Ala. Ct. App. 1921)). But see Richards v. Allianz Life Ins. of N. Am., 62 
P.3d 320, 329 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002) ([W]hile a threat by a party not to perform a contractual 
duty is not by itself improper, it may be found improper if combined with a threat which is 
extortionate, results in a forfeiture, or is made for purposes unrelated to the contract, such as 
inducing the recipient to make a separate contract.”). 
 279 See RADIN, supra note 4, at 151-52. Compare Cabot Corp. v. AVX Corp., 863 N.E.2d 
503, 514 (Mass. 2007) (“[C]ourts have consistently held that the presence of an adequate legal 
remedy undermines claims of economic duress.”) (quoting Ismert & Assocs., Inc. v. New 
England Mut. Life Ins., 801 F.2d 536, 549 (1st Cir. 1986) (Breyer, J., concurring)), with 
Nelson v. Stanley Blacker, Inc., 713 F. Supp. 107, 109 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (“In order to prevail 
on a claim of economic duress, plaintiff must show, inter alia, that he had available no legal 
remedies to avoid the duress.”). 
 280 See Kim, supra note 4, at 277, 281-84, 286. 
 281 See Dawson, supra note 4, at 242-43 (mentioning the “no reasonable alternative” test 
but failing to provide any details on its scope). 
 282 See, e.g., Totem Marine & Tug Barge, Inc. v. Alaska Pipeline Serv., 584 P.2d 15, 22 
(Alaska 1978) (“Thus, in order to avoid a contract, a party must also show that he had no 
reasonable alternative to agreeing to the other party's terms, or, as it is often stated, that he had 
no adequate remedy if the threat were to be carried out.”); see also John Dalzell, Duress by 
Economic Pressure (pt. 2), 20 N.C. L. REV. 341, 369-73, 378-82 (1942) (citing Radich v. 
Hutchins, 95 U.S. 210, 213 (1877)). 
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particular transaction. Thus, whether a contract should be voidable 
because of duress depends on whether the plaintiff, in addition to either 
doing what the defendant demanded or not doing it, had a reasonable third 
option, and if so, whether a reasonably prudent person would have taken 
that available option.283 
For any goods or services, where a party seeks contractual rescission because of 
economic duress, such a plaintiff has the reasonable alternative that it can 
immediately go to court and seek preliminary injunctive relief followed by a 
declaratory judgment on the merits.284 Although resorting to the courts might not be 
an adequate alternative where the purported victim’s immediate business or property 
interests are at stake, the fact remains that plaintiffs can and do invoke these 
alternative remedies in many contexts with little, if any, prejudicial delay.   
This doctrine is further related to the principle that time pressure is frequently a 
necessary element of the coercion. Case law says, “[d]uress will not prevail to 
invalidate a contract entered into with full knowledge of all the facts, with ample 
time and opportunity for investigation, consideration, consultation, and 
reflection.”285 Similarly, duress will be absent where the plaintiff had the 
opportunity to consult with counsel before entering into the allegedly coercive 
contract.286 The burden is on the complaining party to show it lacked this 
opportunity.287 Even if one accepts the dubious argument that arbitration agreements 
are inherently coercive, nothing about arbitration agreements indicates that they 
should operate under different legal standards. 
Should the increasing prevalence of electronic contracting and similar 
innovations result in a different legal test for arbitration agreements? Kim argues that 
a consumer encountering a rolling contract lacks a sufficient legal alternative to 
reject the terms and to return the product.288 With a “rolling contract,” such as for 
computer software, where the box containing these goods has additional terms, these 
post-purchase terms can be binding after the purchaser has reviewed them after the 
purchase.289 The contract is “rolling” because the effect of the transaction is to delay 
                                                           
 283 LORD & WILLISTON, supra note 130, at § 71:14.  
 284 See Cabot Corp., 863 N.E.2d at 511; Gibbs v. SLM Corp., 336 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D. 
Mass. 2004) (“[A]bsent compelling circumstances, the availability of a reasonable alternative, 
such as a legal or administrative remedy, will defeat a claim of economic duress.”). 
 285 In re Nat’l Steel Corp., 316 B.R. 287, 310 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Clement v. Buckley Mercantile Co., 137 N.W. 657, 661 (Mich. 1912)); see also 
Hopkins v. NewDay Fin., LLC, Civ. No. 07-3679, 2008 WL 2654635, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June 
30, 2008) (finding that employees informed that their employer would terminate their 
employment if they failed to sign an agreement to accept arbitration were under severe time 
pressures when they signed the agreement).  
 286 See Carlile v. Snap-on Tools, 648 N.E.2d 317, 323 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); see also 
Degenhardt v. Dillon Co., 669 A.2d 946, 950-51 (Pa. 1996). 
 287 See Nelson v. Stanley Blacker, Inc., 713 F. Supp. 107, 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“In order 
to prevail on a claim of economic duress, plaintiff must show, inter alia, that he had available 
no legal remedies to avoid the duress.”). 
 288 Kim, supra note 4, at 283-84. 
 289 Id. at 279. 
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the contract formation until the buyer has reviewed the terms and decided whether 
they are acceptable.290 Where the buyer timely objects and rejects the goods, he can 
return them and obtain a refund.291 Moreover, “a person who voluntarily declines to 
take with him a box containing important materials relating to the product he 
purchased must be treated as though he had received the box (and the materials in 
it).”292 Absent a purchaser’s timely objection and return of the goods, the terms 
become binding regardless of his subjective assent (or non-assent) to those terms.293   
As can be seen from the above summary, while there is certainly complexity and 
new ways of applying common-law concepts of offer and acceptance to a rolling 
contract, there is no hint of threats, force, coercion, or similar forms of oppression 
against the consumer in the usual circumstances. “While new commerce on the 
Internet [and elsewhere] has exposed courts to many new situations, it has not 
fundamentally changed the principles of contract.”294 Because economic duress 
cannot be based on mere “acquiescence,”295 Kim is incorrect when she argues that 
“[t]he company is forcing the consumer into the contract and the consumer 
acquiesces in order to avoid forfeiture of a vested interest.”296 Therefore, the 
standard concepts of economic duress are applicable to arbitral agreements and no 
persuasive legal reason exists to accept the proposition that rolling contracts are 
automatically reflective of improper economic coercion. 
K. Ratification of Economic Duress 
Ratification issues commonly arise with contentions that the putative victim has 
ratified (i.e., condoned) the original coercive agreement. The essential elements of 
ratification are the removal of duress and the alleged victim’s intent to ratify297 
where at the time of the act the victim had full knowledge of the facts and the 
capability of acting freely.298 The victim’s ratification of a contract initially induced 
through duress can occur in three different ways: (1) intentionally accepting 
contractual benefits; (2) acquiescing in the contract for a substantial time after 
receiving the opportunity to avoid it; or (3) acting upon the contract such as by 
performing under it or acknowledging it.299 Radin and Dawson leave out whether 
they accept the standard “ratification doctrine” and its consequences. Kim implicitly 
                                                           
 290 Id.  
 291 Id.  
 292 Norcia v. Samsung Telecomms. Am., LLC, No. 14–CV–00582–JD, 2014 WL 4652332, 
at *16 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2014). 
 293 Id.; see also John E. Murray, Jr., The Dubious Status of the Rolling Contract Formation 
Theory, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 35, 37-38 (2012) (explaining “rolling contracts”; extensive analysis 
of cases). 
 294 Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 124 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Register.com, 
Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 403 (2d Cir. 2004)) (analyzing rolling contracts).  
 295 See Dunes Hosp., LLC v. Country Kitchen Int’l, 623 N.W.2d 484, 491 (S.D. 2001). 
 296 Kim, supra note 4, at 285. 
 297 United States v. McBride, 571 F. Supp. 596, 613 (S.D. Tex. 1983). 
 298 Hous., Inc. v. Weaver, 246 S.E.2d 219, 228 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978). 
 299 Cabot Corp. v. AVX Corp., 863 N.E.2d 503, 515 (Mass. 2007). 
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rejects this doctrine because she states that under her theory the contract would be 
void and not voidable.300  Kim is correct that only “[a] contract that is voidable for 
duress may be ratified and affirmed.”301 
The economic duress defense seeks to remedy injustice and not to create it.302 
Keeping this principle in mind, what this ratification doctrine requires is for the 
claimant to “complain promptly of the coercive acts that allegedly forced it into the 
contract” or else risk a finding that he has lost the ability to disclaim the contract.303 
In this way, the offeree disaffirming the contract “shortly” after its execution does 
his part to help ensure the stability and reliability of contracts and to dispel the 
doubts that could have surrounded the validity of the contract.304 Further, the 
purported victim disaffirming the voidable contract must restore, “if possible,” the 
benefit to the offeror.305 Arbitration contracts require the same protection to 
preserve the freedom of contract and the predictability of commercial transactions. 
A possibility exists that Radin and Dawson would join Kim in rejecting the view 
that consumers could be held to ratify an otherwise onerous arbitration agreement. 
As with other writers,306 Radin argues that boilerplate contracts shrink legal rights to 
the “vanishing point” and are only “purported contracts.”307 Dawson argues that “a 
boilerplate agreement containing an arbitration clause is simply not a contract under 
state law” when there is an absence of true bargaining.308 Notably, all three 
commentators cite no direct case law authority for these bold propositions.   
                                                           
 300 See Kim, supra note 4, at 278. 
 301 Id.; see also Cabot, 863 N.E.2d at 515; LORD & WILLISTON, supra note 130, at § 71:8 
(stating general rule that contract procured through duress is “voidable” and not “void”). 
 302 Nixon v. Leitman, 224 N.Y.S.2d 448, 468 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962). 
 303 Cabot, 863 N.E.2d at 516. 
 304 Id. at 515; see also VKK Corp. v. Nat’l Football League, 244 F.3d 114, 123 (2d Cir. 
2001) (discussing extensively this policy).  
 305 See, e.g., Consumer Health Info. Corp. v. Amylin Pharms., Inc., 54 F. Supp. 3d 1001, 
1007 (S.D. Ind. 2014) (“[A] party claiming economic duress can effect a rescission only by 
promptly notifying the other party of an intent to rescind the agreement and restoring the 
consideration received.”); Solomon v. FloWarr Mgmt., Inc., 777 S.W.2d 701, 705-06 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. 1989) (stating that persons seeking to rescind the contract must return or be ready, 
willing, and able to return the consideration); Blanchard Press v. Aerosphere, Inc., 51 
N.Y.S.2d 715, 720 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944) (“One coerced into signing an agreement may 
rescind, but, to do so, must return the thing or benefit received thereunder.”); see also  
FARNSWORTH, supra note 136, at § 4:19.  
 306 See, e.g., W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of 
Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 541 (1971) (“But if one does pay attention to 
whether the supposedly necessary consents have been obtained in situations such as these, the 
conclusion is immediate that the standard form is not a contract.”). 
 307 RADIN, supra note 4, at 3, 8, 10-12, 20, 22, 30, 158, 213. 
 308 Dawson, supra note 4, at 239. Dawson further states, “The significant issue is whether 
the ‘contracty thing’ containing the arbitration clause can even be classified as a contract,” and 
“if the agreement cannot be negotiated or altered in any way--then a court could hold that no 
valid contract was ever formed.” Id. at 238. 
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While Radin,309 Kim,310 and Dawson311 each rely on a 1970 law review article 
advocating that an adhesion agreement is more of a product than a contract,312 it is 
clear that this idea is so far outside the mainstream that no court has found this 
conception persuasive.313 Radin and Dawson also do not cite the established 
definition of a “contract” (“[A]n agreement, obligation, or legal tie whereby a party 
binds itself, or becomes bound, expressly or impliedly, to pay a sum of money or to 
perform or omit to do some certain act or thing”)314 or explain why it does not apply 
to adhesion contracts.315 Indeed, “contracts of adhesion are well accepted in the law 
and routinely enforced.”316 Numerous cases hold that adhesion contracts meet the 
test for valid offer and acceptance.317 Further, as another commentator observes, 
“[w]hile some writers have suggested that standard form contracts are not contracts 
at all but rather products that accompany goods and services, courts are reluctant to 
adopt that view, at least explicitly.”318   
Accordingly, it is ironic that Radin, Kim, and Dawson each maintain that 
adhesion contracts with oppressive arbitration agreements are not contracts, but that 
it is also necessary for the law to expand the economic duress defense to relieve 
consumers of liability under these compelled instruments. What each author 
overlooks is on the one hand, if the document does not represent a contract and the 
agreement is void, then economic duress is not necessary to avoid liability because 
                                                           
 309 See RADIN, supra note 4, at 100. 
 310 See Kim, supra note 4, at 267. 
 311 See Dawson, supra note 4, at 238. 
 312 Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 143 (1970). 
 313 Only two cases even mentioned this forty-five year old article and neither case relied on 
Professor Leff’s theory as the ratio decidendi. See Brokers Title Co., v. St. Paul Fire & Marine 
Ins., 610 F.2d 1174, 1179-81 (3d Cir. 1979) (stating that a contract bargained between parties 
of relatively equal strength was not an adhesion contract); Spychalski v. MFA Life Ins., 620 
S.W.2d 388, 393-96 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (“A policy of insurance as a contract of adhesion 
will be given effect according to the objectively reasonable expectations of the insured or 
beneficiary as to the terms.”). Dawson and Radin also fail to mention that Leff undercut his 
own analogy regarding consumer contracts. See Leff, supra note 312, at 157 (“A consumer 
contract is not a thing, at least not the way cars, cows and couches are things. . . .”). In fact, 
Leff candidly observed, “[T]he economics of the mass distribution of goods make [never 
enforcing adhesion contracts] a commercially absurd answer.” Id. at 144. 
 314 Kosmicki v. State, 652 N.W.2d 883, 893 (Neb. 2002). 
 315 To her credit, Radin acknowledges that the law does consider boilerplate to be a valid 
method of contract formation even as she disagrees with this conclusion. See RADIN, supra 
note 4, at 12, 30. 
 316 Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 344, 356 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). 
 317 E.g., Energy Home v. Peay, 406 S.W.3d 828, 834, 836 (Ky. 2013) (stating that adhesion 
agreement is consistent with valid “offer and acceptance.”); Pietroske, Inc. v. Globalcom, Inc., 
685 N.W.2d 884, 888 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004) (“Nothing in the contract prevented a true meeting 
of the minds.”). 
 318 Juliet M. Moringiello, Signals, Assent and Internet Contracting, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 
1307, 1314 (2005). 
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with a void contract there are no liabilities.319 On the other hand, if the authors are 
saying that a lenient standard of economic duress is needed, then these commentators 
are accepting the possibility there can be a contract resulting from such 
circumstances. A transaction cannot be both a contract and a non-contract at the 
same time. 
The common-law ratification doctrine treats both parties fairly, facilitates 
arbitration, and enhances the commercial law system. It is best to leave it to the 
individual under the freedom of contract to seek out the proper advice and to affirm 
or disaffirm the original coercive transaction to meet the consumer’s best interests. 
At the same time, under the above-cited requirement that the victim make restitution 
to the other party “if possible,” fairness requires that the individual claimant make 
restitution to the merchant in the interests of justice. One would predict that many, if 
not most, private parties would be unwilling to sacrifice the benefits of the contract 
that could later be seen as the product of economic duress simply because of the 
inclusion of an arbitration remedy. 
L. Conversion of Adhesion Contracts into Instruments of Duress 
The practical effect of the three authors’ reformulated duress doctrines is that 
they have converted all adhesion contracts with pre-dispute arbitration clauses into 
instruments of duress. Their definition of an improperly coercive contract—that it is 
a take-it-or-leave-it deal requiring consent to a non-negotiable contract or forgoing 
certain benefits—is actually the definition of a contract of adhesion.320 In point of 
fact, however, case law states that an adhesion contract does not necessarily 
implicate economic duress.321 Similarly, another commentator rejects the argument 
that an adhesion contract with an arbitration clause is inherently coercive: 
That is wrong. The consumer is free to put the pen down without signing 
the form. There is no duress in the typical “adhesion” contract. A 
consumer who contracts in such circumstances does so voluntarily. The 
                                                           
 319 See 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 
§ 1:20 (4th ed. 2013) (“A promise for breach of which the law neither gives a remedy nor 
otherwise recognizes a duty of performance by the promisor is often called a void contract.”); 
17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 10 (2014) (“A void contract is no contract at all; it binds no one 
and is a mere nullity.”); see also Quality Prods. & Concepts Co. v. Nagel Precision, Inc., 666 
N.W.2d 251, 258 (Mich. 2003) (“Where mutual assent does not exist, a contract does not 
exist.”). If the contract does not exist, there is nothing for a court to “revise.” 
 320 Radin, Kim, and Dawson each contend that the contracts at issue are “contracts of 
adhesion.” See RADIN, supra note 4, at 82-83, 147; Kim, supra note 4, at 267, 271; Dawson, 
supra note 4, at 239. The term “adhesion contract” refers to a standardized contract prepared 
entirely by one party to the transaction for the acceptance of the other; such a contract, due to 
the disparity in bargaining power between the draftsman and the second party, must be 
accepted or rejected by the second party on a “take it or leave it” basis, without opportunity 
for bargaining and under such conditions that the “adherer” cannot obtain the desired product 
or service save by acquiescing in the form agreement. Steven v. Fid. & Cas. Co., 377 P.2d 
284, 297 (Cal. 1962).  
 321 See Griffith Labs. U.S.A., Inc. v. Pomper, 577 F. Supp. 903, 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) 
(“Accordingly, even if [an employee] was asked to sign his contract with [the employer] on a 
‘take it or leave it’ basis, it was not signed under duress and therefore remains valid.”).   
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form may contain boilerplate terms which are unenforceable, but that does 
not make the contract any less voluntary.322 
The three authors have discounted that “[adhesion contracts] are not inherently 
sinister and automatically unenforceable.”323 With the bulk of contracts signed in 
this country being form contracts — “a natural concomitant of our mass production-
mass consumer society” — any rule automatically invalidating adhesion contracts 
would be “completely unworkable.”324 Because judges recognize that “the times in 
which consumer contracts were anything other than adhesive are long past,”325 the 
authors’ unduly pro-claimant standard regarding arbitration agreements, which allow 
relatively free exercise of rescission for duress, would destabilize large sectors of the 
national economy. 
M. Duress and Monopolies 
Dawson notes that regional monopolies, such as public utilities or a hospital, 
often use contracts with mandated arbitration clauses.326 Dawson advocates that 
when a court is asked to enforce these clauses, the “judge should apply the ‘no 
reasonable alternative test’ to hold that the consumer entered the contract for the 
essential good under duress and therefore no contract was ever actually formed.” 327  
Dawson’s concerns are not well founded. When an organization is a monopoly, 
its status is not per se illegal or improper under the antitrust laws.328 The illegality 
arises only where the entity has acquired or maintained its strategic position, or 
sought to expand its market position, through proscribed restraints of trade.329 
Furthermore, when a utility charges a consumer the rate authorized by statute or rule, 
such as the directive of a public service commission, a lawful rate does not indicate 
duress. This conclusion finds support in the all-encompassing principle that “[i]t is 
                                                           
 322 Ware, supra note 7, at 201 (responding to an argument by two other commentators that 
when a merchant presents to a consumer a form contract with an arbitration clause, the 
consumer has “no alternative” but to sign it because the duty to arbitrate is “imposed” on the 
consumer). 
 323 Greenpoint Credit, LLC v. Reynolds, 151 S.W.3d 868, 874 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) 
(quoting Hartland Comput. Leasing Corp. v. Ins Man, Inc., 770 S.W.2d 525, 527 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1989)). 
 324 Id. at 874-75. 
 325 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011). But contracts with 
mandatory arbitration clauses are not always adhesive. See, e.g., Zaklit v. Glob. Linguist Sols., 
LLC, 53 F. Supp. 3d 835, 845-46 (E.D. Va. 2014) (holding that an employment contract is not 
an adhesion contract); Blackburn v. Ronald Kluchin Architects, Inc., No. 89203, 2007 WL 
4340861, at *4-5 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2007) (holding that a residential construction 
contract was not an adhesion contract). 
 326 Dawson, supra note 4, at 245. 
 327 Id. 
 328 See Hatley v. Am. Quarter Horse Ass’n, 552 F.2d 646, 651-53 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 329 Id. 
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never duress to do that which a party has a legal right to do.”330 It is only where the 
utility charges a customer an illegal exaction, such as a discriminatory rate as 
compared with similarly situated consumers, will the payment reflect implied or 
even express duress.331 Nothing about arbitral agreements counsels a different 
approach. 
N. Duress and Structures of Subordination and Social Inequalities 
Dawson argues that current duress doctrine focuses excessively on economic 
conditions and insufficiently on “the role law plays in creating and maintaining 
structures of subordination” and social “inequalities.”332 Citing the works of 
Catharine A. MacKinnon, he also criticizes courts for giving insufficient attention to 
gender issues in light of the contention that the law favors “men over women.”333 
Dawson places particular emphasis on the writings of Orit Gan, who contends that 
judges should create a “broader, more complex duress doctrine that is sensitive to 
social inequality and context and that includes aggrieved parties’ experiences and 
perspectives.”334 
Dawson overlooks the numerous cases that in fact deploy the same criteria he 
advocates should be used to define the scope of duress. These cases stand for the 
position that when deciding whether a party  
was subject to duress or coercion in executing a contract, a court should 
take into consideration all of the circumstances surrounding the 
transaction, including, for example, the age, gender, educational level, 
mental, physical, and emotional health and business acumen and 
sophistication of the complaining party, as well as any prior dealings or 
other relationship, whether of affinity or of consanguinity, that may exist 
between the parties.335   
While Dawson argues that the law fails to look beyond economic duress and 
should further examine social “inequalities,”336 he omitted decisions applying the 
duress defense and stating that “[s]ocial or economic pressure illegally or immorally 
applied [also] may be sufficient.”337 Under these decisions, the wrongfulness of 
                                                           
 330 Choksi v. Shah, 8 So.3d 288, 294-95 (Ala. 2008) (quoting Neuberger v.  Preferred 
Accident Ins. Co., 89 So. 90, 92 (Ala. Ct. App. 1921)). 
 331 Tex. Power & Light Co. v. Doering Hotel Co., 147 S.W.2d 897, 905 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1941), aff’d, 162 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. 1942). 
 332 Dawson, supra note 4, at 243. 
 333 Id. at 243-44. 
 334 Gan, supra note 204, at 171. 
 335 LORD & WILLISTON, supra note 130, at § 71:11 (emphasis added); see also Rust v. 
Drexel Firestone Inc., 352 F. Supp. 715, 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). 
 336 See Dawson, supra note 4, at 243 (citing Deborah Waire Post, Outsider Jurisprudence 
and the “Unthinkable” Tale: Spousal Abuse and the Doctrine of Duress, 26 U. HAW. L. REV. 
469, 483 (2004)). 
 337 Gibbs v. SLM Corp., 336 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D. Mass. 2004) (quoting Int'l Underwater 
Contractors, Inc. v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 393 N.E.2d 968, 970 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1979)). 
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duress includes going beyond mere economics where it violates the law, a contract, 
or morality.338 Indeed, as referenced above, the “gender” of the victim is a specific 
judicial concern in determining the presence of duress.  
The current doctrines more than adequately incorporate Dawson’s belief that an 
economic duress defense should take into account both the economic and non-
economic aspects of the parties’ relationship from a broader societal perspective, 
including the moral aspects of the transaction and the victim’s “experiences and 
perspectives.”339 Again, nothing about arbitration agreements should exempt them 
from this analysis. 
CONCLUSION 
“[T]he fundamental issue in duress cases is whether the statement which induced 
agreement is the type of offer . . . that the law should discourage as oppressive and 
thus improper.”340 The authors’ low bar for economic duress as applied to 
arbitration agreements does not meet this standard. Their arguments violate 
foundational legal principles, including freedom of contract, that eliminate any real 
prospect that a state would adopt their doctrinal departures.  The following reasons 
support rejection for their proposals.  
First, the FAA’s wide ranging preemption provision and the courts’ strong 
enforcement of this policy render stillborn the authors’ suggested reforms to expand 
(more accurately to hollow out) the common-law duress defense to the enforcement 
of arbitral contracts. The existing common-law defense of duress is fair to both 
offerors and offerees as it strikes the proper balance between binding the buyer to the 
arbitral process he agreed to in the contract but prohibiting the seller from enforcing 
a bargain if he procured it through unduly coercive tactics. 
Second, the proposals to dilute the economic duress defense undermine the 
predictability and reliability of contracts to the detriment of all buyers and sellers. 
Economic duress is present in almost all contract bargaining. Because of that 
business reality, and to avoid wholesale destabilization of various business sectors, 
the law must reserve the economic duress defense for extreme and extraordinary 
cases. Accordingly, this Article has established why sound public policy requires a 
narrow application of the economic duress defense in arbitration cases.  
 
 
                                                           
 338 Crossroads Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Sterling Truck Corp., 792 N.E.2d 488, 494 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2003) (“A demand is not duress unless it is ‘wrongful’ in the sense that it violates the 
law, a contract, or morality.”); see also Giesel, supra note 181, at 489 (collecting cases). A 
few courts hold otherwise on whether a wrongful act includes a morally wrong act. See Dunes 
Hosp., LLC v. Country Kitchen Int'l, 623 N.W.2d 484, 490-91 (S.D. 2001).  
 339 Dawson, supra note 4, at 244 (citing Orit Gan, Contractual Duress and Relations of 
Power, 36 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 171 (2013)). 
 340 Richards v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 62 P.3d 320, 327 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002). 
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